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Research Study

International and Transnational Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prognosis

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FOREWORD

The primary goals of this study are to cast the problem of internationalized terror into clear perspective and to provide the reader with a framework for a more systematic grasp of the subject. Terrorism is, however, a particularly controversial and complex phenomenon. Hence, it must be emphasized that the approach adopted and the judgments advanced are those of the author, David L. Milbank. So, too, are the basic definitions. And although it is analytically useful for the purposes of this paper, the distinction made between international and transnational terrorism is bound to draw some critical comment—if only because the former term has acquired so broad a currency in academic and journalistic literature.

The statistics presented also break new ground. This is because the author was able to draw on a comprehensive new data bank called ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events) that was developed for the Office of Political Research by Edward F. Mickolus during the summer of 1975 as a related but separate project.

Despite this advantage, however, several words of caution about the figures and statistical inferences that are set forth in this study are in order. In the first place, there are many significant gaps in our knowledge about specific incidents and groups—and even those terrorist organizations and actions on which there is considerable reliable information do not always fit neatly into the typologies that have been created for them. Moreover, the universe of incidents under review is small enough that unintended omissions (of which there are undoubtedly many) or erroneous classification of borderline events could have a statistically significant impact.

Comments or questions concerning this study (which does not represent a CIA position) will be welcomed. They should be addressed to the Director, Political Research.

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SUMMARY AND KEY JUDGMENTS

I. DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this study, international and transnational terrorism are defined as follows:

Common Characteristics: The threat or use of violence for political purposes when (1) such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than its immediate victims, and (2) its ramifications transcend national boundaries (as a result, for example, of the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its locale, the identity of its institutional or human victims, its declared objectives, or the mechanics of its resolution).

International Terrorism: Such action when carried out by individuals or groups controlled by a sovereign state.

Transnational Terrorism: Such action when carried out by basically autonomous non-state actors, whether or not they enjoy some degree of support from sympathetic states.

II. THE PHENOMENA IN RETROSPECT

There has been a marked and enduring upsurge in *transnational terrorism* since 1967 that has been characterized by:

- A substantial increase in the number of terrorist groups involved as well as in the number of countries in which they are operating;
- A trend toward greater international contact and cooperation among terrorist groups;
- A trend toward bolder and more dramatic actions;
- The general popularity of American targets; and
- A number of significant regional differences in the intensity and nature of such violence.

This upsurge is attributable in part to the dynamics of the Middle East conflict, an imbroglio which affects the interests of a large number of nations and is attended by particularly deep-seated feelings of bitterness and frustration. But the problem of transnational terrorism

would not have mushroomed to its present dimensions were it not for the concurrent convergence and acceleration of a number of changes in the global environment that had begun to take shape much earlier, e.g.:

- The technological advances that have provided terrorists with new mobility, new weaponry, and (through the introduction of TV-capable satellite communications) the near certain prospect that their more dramatic actions will receive prompt and world-wide publicity;
- The growth, fed by modernizing change, of global and regional ties, dependencies and obligations that have both provided terrorists with a host of new and potentially highly disruptive targets for attack (e.g., power grids and jumbo aircraft) and fostered a reactive upsurge in nationalism and ethnicity;
- An increasingly permissive political environment born of the challenge raised to the postwar order by the developing nations of the Third World, the "maverick" Communist regimes, various dissatisfied second rank powers, and a broad array of social forces fired, with differing degrees of responsibility, by a new sense of "social conscience";
- The persistent if uneven behavior of those states, less than a score in number, that have furnished practicing or potential terrorists with funds, arms, training, documentation, and other operational support; and
- Changes in the overall economic environment that have fanned local dissidence and fed the communities of emigre workers that can provide terrorists with cover, recruits, and various forms of operational support.

There has not, however, been a parallel upsurge in *international terrorism*. Although there has been a good deal of such activity associated with the Middle East conflict over the past decade, the dimensions of the problem are essentially no greater today than they were in 1968.

Another significant difference stems from the fact that resort to *international terrorism* is just as likely to result from calculations concerning the relative efficacy of alternative methods of bringing national power to bear in a given situation as from an outright dearth of national resources. Hence, such behavior has not been the special province of any particular category of state. In contrast, as an option more congenial to urban than to rural groups, *transnational terrorism* has been characteristically spawned by societies at a mid to advanced stage of socio-economic development.

For its practioners, terrorism's principal drawback is that its consequences are to a considerable degree unpredictable. As demonstrated in Jordan in 1970 and in Uruguay between 1970 and 1972, even what seem to be dramatic tactical successes can lead to strategic reverses of major proportions. All told, however, the record to date shows that the personal risks that have been incurred by international and transnational terrorists have been relatively low, and that their chances of achieving at least some of their near-term objectives have been strong. Moreover, because the impact of their activity has been magnified by the publicity it has received and by its interaction with other destabilizing trends and forces, its disruptive effects have been grossly disproportionate to the resources employed by the terrorists as well as to the actual damage done in terms of the cost to life and property.

With the exception of a number of bilateral agreements of proven utility (most notably the US-Cuban accord of 1973), the international response to terrorism has been relatively weak and ineffective. The principal obstacles to greater progress in this field have been the controversy over *justifiable* versus *illegal* political violence, a broad resistance to such further infringement of national sovereignty as would be implied in any inflexible curtailment of the right to grant political asylum, and a natural reluctance on the part of many states to commit themselves to any course of action that might invite retribution—either by terrorist groups or by states sympathetic to the terrorists' cause.

III. THE OUTLOOK

International terrorism seems unlikely to pose much more of a threat to world order or US interests in the decade ahead than it does today.

- Even in its currently rather fluid condition, the international system subjects states to a host of legal obligations and practical constraints that they can ignore only at considerable risk.
- The potential implications of the various state-sponsored terrorist incidents that have been associated with the Middle East conflict notwithstanding, it seems likely that the employment of terrorist groups in a surrogate warfare role will continue to be more the exception than the rule for some time to come.

Despite the potentially salutary impact of some recent or likely developments (including the tougher stance toward terrorists that has been adopted by a number of states and the probability that technical innovations in the security field will make terrorism a more risky affair), the outlook for *transnational terrorism* is considerably less

encouraging. Specifically, the following factors and trends hold promise of aggravating the problem:

- The combined effects of technological advance, modernizing social and economic change, and growing interdependence will probably generate further increases in (1) divisive ethnicity and nationalism, (2) urban unrest, (3) terrorist capabilities, and (4) societal vulnerabilities.
- The widespread erosion of established institutions of authority—manifested in multiple challenges to the postwar international order and the increasing difficulties of governance encountered at the national level—that has both invited and facilitated terrorist activity in recent years seems likely to persist throughout much of the decade ahead.
- Since the net thrust of the forces at work within the international community promises to remain more centrifugal than centripetal, it seems unlikely that efforts to combat terrorism through binding world-wide conventions will prove to be much more effective than in the past.
- The likelihood that (1) national liberation and leftist revolutionary formations will continue to receive both moral and material support from a wide variety of transnational and international organizations and (2) transnational contact and cooperation among terrorist groups will gain further momentum holds forth the ominous prospect of the emergence of a complex support base for transnational terrorist activity that is largely independent of—and quite resistant to control by—the state-centered international system.
- Under such circumstances, any governmental assistance rendered to terrorist groups could have an even more deleterious impact than in the past, for it would risk simply increasing the recipients' potential for autonomous action.
- The problems of (1) extensive and sometime sympathetic publicity for terrorist acts and (2) the diffusion of terrorist-adaptable technological know-how are likely to persist in most parts of the world and thus to reinforce the risks associated with the wholesale deployment of sophisticated (and in many cases, man-portable) weaponry and the race to sell nuclear technology and modern armaments to developing countries.

The prospect of nuclear-armed terrorists can, in fact, no longer be dismissed. But because of the major problems that would be involved in the acquisition, storage, transport, and employment of a nuclear device, a more likely scenario—at least in the short term—would be a terrorist

seizure of a nuclear weapons storage facility or a nuclear power plant to exploit the publicity and the bargaining power inherent in the attendant threat of radiological pollution.

A more pressing threat, however, would seem to lie in the field of chemical, biological, and radiological agents of mass destruction. Not only are many of these agents relatively easy to acquire, but (because small—sometimes minute—quantities are usually all that are needed for potentially devastating effect) they also tend to be easy to conceal, easy to transport, and easy to introduce into the target area.

All told, transnational terrorism promises to pose a continuing and potentially gravely unsettling problem for the world community until such time—possibly years hence—that the international system gels into new and generally accepted contours. Although the frequency and intensity of violence in some current trouble spots will probably decline, it seems likely that:

- The overall number of terrorist groups engaged in transnational terrorist activity will, at best, remain at about the present level;
- The number of countries in which these groups are operating will increase;
- Because of their symbolic value, their availability, and the embarrassment they can create, the popularity of American targets will remain high;
- The world will witness steadily greater and more widespread sophistication in terrorist targetting, execution, and weaponry; and
- Although most terrorist groups will probably continue to be deterred by both moral considerations and calculations of the risks involved, the danger that a fanatic few might resort to weapons of mass destruction will increase accordingly.

IV. IMPLICATIONS

The phenomenon of widespread internationalized terror is not only likely to persist for at least the next several years, but also to evolve in ways that could pose a more substantial threat to US interests—and, under certain circumstances, to world order—than in the recent past.

- Whether or not weapons of mass destruction are actually brought into play, the odds are that the impact of transnational terror will be more sharply felt in the US in the years just ahead—primarily as the result of periodic increases in attacks on American targets abroad, but possibly through more frequent terrorist demands on the US Government and

occasional operations on US soil by foreign-based groups as well.

- Even if the problem of internationalized terror is not brought closer to home in the ways suggested above, it promises to impinge more directly on US interests and options with respect to a broad range of critical issue areas, including both East-West and North-South relations, the politically and economically sensitive questions of arms sales and the transfer of advanced technology, and the resolution of problems associated with the dependence of Western industrialized countries on foreign energy sources.

The importance of factors that are likely to affect the objective capabilities and options of terrorist groups in the years ahead is obvious. But in the final analysis, it is man's subjective perception of "reality" that serves as the primary determinant of his political behavior. Hence, those variables (e.g., cultural heritage, credo, and changes in the overall political environment) that can shape or alter the prisms through which the terrorists concerned view the world around them will bear equal attention.

Indeed, although the dimensions of the threat posed by internationalized terror should not be overdrawn, the factors bearing on this phenomenon and its potential ramifications are so numerous and cut across so many jurisdictional and disciplinary lines that the development of more effective national and international countermeasures is likely to be a particularly demanding task. Sadly, there are no sure guidelines for endowing any given government's approach to the problem of terrorism with the qualities required to meet this challenge. But while any number of alternative courses of action could prove equally effective, it bears emphasis that together with *timely intelligence* and *sound multi-disciplinary analytical support*, *flexibility* and *extensive coordination* (both intra- and inter-state) would seem to be critical to devising and implementing a counter-terrorist strategy that is both internally consistent and minimally disruptive to national values and foreign policy objectives in terms of "hidden" social, political, and economic costs.

THE DISCUSSION

I. THE OBJECTIVES AND BOUNDARIES OF INQUIRY

Political violence predates recorded history. As a distinctive form of political violence sporadically employed by rulers and ruled alike, terrorism is probably not much younger—albeit it owes its name and subsequent conceptual flowering to the French Reign of Terror (1793-1794). Nor is the spill-over of terrorist activity onto the international stage a particularly recent development: witness the stir caused by various anarchist groups operating in Europe and North America in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as well as by the behavior of a few of their more self-interested political contemporaries. Some 70 years ago, for example, a renegade Moroccan chieftain foreshadowed a tactic favored by a number of terrorist groups today by kidnapping two foreign businessmen (one English, the other of dubious American citizenship) in a successful effort to get England and the US to pressure France into forcing the Sultan to accede to a long list of demands—including a substantial ransom, the release of a large number of prisoners, the cession of two territorial districts, and the arrest of a few key enemies.

But despite historical precedents and parallels, modern-day terrorism is very much a function of our times. Advances in technology and growing world interdependence have afforded terrorists new mobility, new targets, new weaponry, and the near certain prospect that their more dramatic acts will receive prompt and world-wide publicity. Moreover, recent changes in the overall political and economic climate have provided terrorists with a somewhat more hospitable environment in which to operate.

Indeed, there has been such an upsurge of terrorist activity in recent years that some observers have warned that we may be entering a veritable age of terrorism. Among other things, there has been a marked increase in the number of active terrorist groups as well as in the number of countries in which they are operating. Internal and international cooperation among terrorist groups has also risen notably. There has been a trend toward bolder and

more dramatic actions, with an accompanying escalation of casualties, damage, and demands. And most importantly, perhaps, there has been a quantum jump in terrorist incidents affecting the interests of more than one state.

Not surprisingly, these developments have generated unprecedented interest in terrorism as a subject for serious research and analysis. In sharp contrast with the situation which prevailed only a decade or so ago, existing literature—both open and classified—now offers a wide range of useful insights into the root causes, logic, and characteristic attributes of political terrorism as well as a substantial number of detailed case studies.

The trouble is that the picture which emerges is still confused and incomplete. For one thing, there is as yet no generally accepted definition of terrorism *per se*, much less of its international or transnational variants. For another, much of the work that has been done on terrorism suffers from the limiting effects of narrowly focused tactical concerns or of particularistic institutional and personal biases. And, largely because of these differing perspectives and priorities, little progress has been made toward development of a comprehensive and readily accessible data base. In short, we are still hard put to explain the current state of affairs or to venture firm predictions about the future.

Of necessity, therefore, this study is an exercise in both synthesis and innovation. It is confined to an examination of international and transnational terrorism as defined in Section II below (with primary emphasis on transnational terrorism as, in the short term at least, potentially the more injurious to US interests). Its principal underlying assumptions are three. The first is that the basic societal problems and tensions that can give rise to political violence—and thus to terrorism—are likely to prove particularly intractable in this era of rapid change, growing nationalism and ethnicity, and world-wide economic strains. Such irritants may, in fact, be treated as "givens" in the global environment for many years to come. The reader is forewarned that because of this, and because they have already received considerable

scholarly attention, these factors will not be subjected to extensive analysis here.*

Corollary to the above, it is assumed that the potential for domestic, international, and transnational terrorism will remain high in the decade ahead and that the scope of the problem will therefore depend primarily on factors affecting the opportunities, alternatives, and behavioral constraints faced by the group actors involved.

Finally, it is postulated that man's *subjective* perception of "reality" serves as the primary determinant of his political behavior. Hence, without neglecting the many factors that have affected—or that may affect—the objective capabilities and options of terrorist groups, this paper repeatedly draws attention to those variables (e.g., cultural heritage, credo, and changes in the overall political environment) that can shape or alter the prisms through which the terrorists concerned view the world around them.

Broadly stated, the objectives of the study are to gain a better understanding of the dynamics and consequences of international and transnational terrorism since 1965, to identify those factors likely to promote or inhibit such activity in the years ahead, and to assess the implications of these findings with respect to US policies and interests. Such goals preclude any effort to gauge the extent of the threat posed to US interests and world order by any particular terrorist group or consortium. Given the host of variables that would have to be considered, that task must remain the province of traditional and painstaking case-by-case analysis. It is hoped, however, that the substantive generalizations and methodological techniques that are set forth below will provide a valuable frame of reference for more definitive treatments of specific aspects of the terrorism problem.

II. ESTABLISHING AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Definitions

As a first step, it is necessary to cut through some of the semantic and value-generated fog which currently

*These factors include weak and inefficient government, societal rivalries and inequities, social and economic dislocations stemming from the accelerating process of change, and high levels of frustration born of social immobility or feelings of relative deprivation. (The term relative deprivation is defined by its originator, Professor Ted Robert Gurr, as a "perceived discrepancy between the goods and conditions of life which members of a group believe are their due and the goods and conditions which they think they can in fact get and keep." *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970, p. 319.)

surrounds the concept of terrorism and to spell out precisely what sort of behavior falls within the purview of this study. In part, the existing confusion is attributable to journalistic license and a popular tendency to label terrorist a host of acts in which the element of terror is clearly incidental to other and more pressing objectives. But, as amply illustrated by the tortured and fruitless efforts of a 35-member *ad hoc* UN committee to define (and thereby, in effect, to outlaw) international terrorism not long ago, the heart of the problem lies in differing moral perspectives and priorities.* Simply stated, one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.

Since terrorism always involves the deliberate breach of generally accepted bounds for individual or collective violence, it is difficult to define in totally value-free terms. Nevertheless, it can be set in a relatively rigorous and objective perspective. A good way to begin is by quoting a perceptive description of the characteristic attributes of terrorism by one of the leading specialists on the subject.

The threat . . . violence, individual acts of violence, or a campaign of violence designed primarily to instill fear—to terrorize—may be called terrorism. Terrorism is violence for effect: not only, and sometimes not at all, for the effect on the actual victims of the terrorists. In fact, the victim may be totally unrelated to the terrorists' cause. Terrorism is violence aimed at the people watching. Fear is the intended effect, not the byproduct, of terrorism. That, at least, distinguishes terrorist tactics from mugging and other forms of violent crime that may terrify but are not terrorism.**

Political terrorism is, then, the above sort of violence employed in pursuit of political objectives. It is, as claimed by its practitioners, "propaganda of the deed." It is calculated violence aimed at influencing the attitude and behavior of one or more target audiences. Its proximate objectives may include publicity, coercion, extortion, disorientation and despair, provocation of unpopular countermeasures, and (with regard to the terrorists themselves) morale-building. Its ultimate goals can be either concrete (e.g., the seizure or consolidation of political power or

*The committee, which met in New York from 16 July to 11 August 1973, was also unable to reach agreement on either the causes of international terrorism or on measures which might be taken to prevent such activity. In consequence, its report was simply a compendium of disparate and conflicting views. To date, neither the UN General Assembly nor the Sixth Committee thereof has been able (or willing) to find time to consider it.

**Brian Jenkins, *International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict*, Research Paper No. 48, California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy (Los Angeles: Crescent Publications, 1975), p. 1.

the attainment of ethnic self-rule) or nebulous (e.g., the fomenting of world-wide revolution).*

The foregoing observations and generalizations form the basis for the definitions of international and transnational terrorism that are employed in this study. These are as follows:

- Common Characteristics:** The threat or use of violence for political purposes when (1) such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than its immediate victims, and (2) its ramifications transcend national boundaries (as a result, for example, of the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its locale, the identity of its institutional or human victims, its declared objectives, or the mechanics of its resolution).
- International Terrorism:** Such action when carried out by individuals or groups controlled by a sovereign state.
- Transnational Terrorism:** Such action when carried out by basically autonomous non-state actors, whether or not they enjoy some degree of support from sympathetic states.**

Just how meaningful the posited distinction between international and transnational terrorism is likely to be in the longer run is, of course, open to question. But

*In his chapter entitled "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation" in *Internal War: Problems and Approaches* (edited by Harry Eckstein and published by Collier-Macmillan Ltd., London, in 1964), Thomas P. Thornton defines political terror as "a symbolic act designed to influence political behavior by extranormal means, entailing the use or threat of violence." Other particularly useful general analyses of political terrorism are to be found in Brian Jenkins, *op cit.*; Robert Moss, *Urban Guerrillas* (London: Temple Smith, 1972); Brian Crozier, ed., *Annual of Power and Conflict*, 1972-73 and 1973-74 (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict); Paul Wilkinson, *Political Terrorism* (London: Macmillan, 1974); Martha C. Hutchinson, "The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Volume XVI, Number 3, September 1972, pp. 383-396; and Philip A. Karber, "Urban Terrorism: Baseline Data and a Conceptual Framework," *Social Science Quarterly*, Volume 52, December 1971, pp. 521-533. The last-named author stresses the symbolic qualities of political terrorism and suggests that it can be analyzed in much the same fashion as other mediums of communication.

**Given the element of governmental patronage that is common to both, the boundary line between transnational and international terrorism is often difficult to draw. To the degree that it can be determined, the key distinction lies in who is calling the shots with respect to a given action or campaign. Hence, groups can and do drift back and forth across the line. For example, even a one-time "contract job" undertaken on behalf of a governmental actor by a group that normally acts according to its own lights qualifies as international terrorism.

for the time being, at least, the two phenomena do pose questions and problems of a qualitatively different order. For one thing, since it involves the behavior of state actors, international terrorism can in theory be handled and contained within the framework of the existing international system with only minor adjustments. Moreover, its practitioners seem to be somewhat fewer—or, with a few notable exceptions, at least more restrained—than at some other points of time in the recent past. Transnational terrorism, on the other hand, has been growing in both geographic scope and intensity. And the international system is still ill-equipped to deal with autonomous non-state actors.

Method

At best, discussions of methodology carry the risk of blurring and diluting the analytical thrust of a research paper. But the subject at hand presents something of a special case—one in which a few words about the analytical techniques employed are needed to lay the groundwork for subsequent discussion. For one thing the myriad of factors which bear on terrorist activity dictated adoption of a multi-disciplinary approach. For another, the fuzzy boundaries that separate terrorism from other forms of violence—and the previously cited lack of any generally accepted analytical approach or comprehensive and logically organized data base—required the construction of a relatively detailed framework for screening and ordering the available information.

Briefly, a number of working hypotheses derived from a survey of the existing literature on both terrorism and political violence *per se* were used to generate a list of (1) key group and environmental variables that appear to have affected the scope, nature, and intensity of international and transnational terrorism in recent years, and (2) analytically useful event characteristics. (Those initial hypotheses that survived subsequent testing appear, together with later additions, as judgments and conclusions at various points in this study.)

The resultant tabulation is presented in somewhat abbreviated form at Appendix A. It will be noted that, in addition to fulfilling their primary (and distinctly traditional) disciplinary function, most of the variables listed therein are amenable to machine processing and manipulation. And while, as suggested in the Foreword, the statistical inferences that are highlighted below rest on sometimes rather rudimentary data, they can—and did—serve to refine some of

the author's preliminary assumptions and hypotheses and to suggest other trends and patterns that could be significant.

III. THE PHENOMENA IN RETROSPECT

What, Where, and When?

As previously indicated, international and transnational terrorism were not yet matters of much official or academic concern in 1965. In contrast to other forms of political violence, there simply had not been very much of either since the close of World War II—at least not of the sort that made headlines. Moreover, much of what there was had been associated with—and overshadowed by the more important consequences of—clear-cut adversary relationships stemming from either the Cold War or the anti-colonial struggle. For the most part, noncombatant third parties had been left unmolested.

It is true, of course, that two brief flurries of skyjacking had already drawn attention to a potential new problem area. But, for the most part, neither had involved more than a few actions that would be classified as terrorism under the definition employed here. The first, in the early 50s, had been comprised almost entirely of Eastern European aircraft commandeered for the sole purpose of escape to the West. And while the second, which extended from the late 50s to the early 60s, had been climaxed by the first postwar hijackings of American airliners (thereby prompting the US to press for a comprehensive international convention covering crimes committed on civilian aircraft engaged in international aviation), it too had been attributable primarily to individuals seeking personal advantage—e.g., expedient transport to or from Cuba or outright extortion—rather than political leverage or impact.

In any event, skyjackings tapered off again in 1963. The overall level of international and transnational terrorist activity remained relatively low through 1966, then turned upward against the backdrop of intensified Palestinian guerrilla activity that preceded the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Admittedly, the record up to that point is sketchy. For one thing, the mass media still lacked either the incentive or the technical means for systematic and comprehensive coverage of terrorist incidents—and many undoubtedly went unreported. But even if Figure 1 below substantially understates the number of international and transnational terrorist incidents that occurred in the 1965-1967 period, the international impact of such activity was negligible. Indeed, when the qualitative

dimension is added in, 1968 emerges as a watershed year. At that juncture, a combination of Palestinian initiatives and the cumulative impact of the broader environmental trends discussed below seems to have finally sensitized dissident groups throughout the world to their latent and growing potential for effective transnational terrorist activity.

From 1 January 1968 through 31 December 1975, there were at least 913 recorded international and transnational terrorist incidents.* Of these, 123 were kidnappings; 31 were barricade and hostage episodes; 375 entailed the use of explosive devices of one type or another; 95 were armed assaults or ambushes; 137 involved the hijacking of an aircraft or other means of transportation; 59 fell under the category of incendiary attack or arson; 48 constituted assassination or murder; and 45 were characterized by other forms of violence. All told, more than 140 terrorist organizations—including a number of fictional entities created to shield the identity of the perpetrators of some particularly shocking or politically sensitive acts—from nearly 50 different countries or disputed territories (e.g., Palestine) have thus far been linked to this activity, and there may have been more.**

Figure 2 portrays the overall geographic distribution of international and transnational terrorist incidents for the 1965-1975 period. A more informative breakdown of 1968-1975 statistics by type of event and other operational criteria is provided in Appendix B.

Despite the widespread and continuing popularity of certain "traditional" forms of violence (e.g., assassinations and highly discriminate bombings), the picture which emerges from these assorted charts and tables underscores a number of marked regional and time-related variations in the frequency and nature of *transnational* terrorist incidents.*** Sub-Saharan Africa and large parts of Asia have, for example,

*This figure excludes terrorist attacks on US and allied personnel and installations in Indochina. It also excludes most of the mutual assassination efforts and cross-border operations associated with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The only exceptions in this regard are incidents that either victimized noncombatant nationals of states outside the principal arena of conflict or were of such a nature that they became the object of international controversy.

**There are relatively few political groups in the world that are totally dedicated to terrorist violence. As used here, the term terrorist organization simply denotes a group that has employed terrorist tactics.

***Although international and transnational terrorist incidents are lumped together in these charts, the former were outnumbered by the latter by more than 20 to 1 and thus had little impact on the patterns reflected therein.

Figure 1





Figure 2

Geographic Distribution of International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents, 1965-75




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been relatively free of such activity. So too has the Soviet/East European region. Latin Americans have demonstrated a particular affinity for kidnapping foreign diplomats and businessmen. On the other hand, except for skyjackings, seemingly indiscriminate and potentially bloody spectacles—e.g., mass hostage episodes, large bombs in public places, Lod Airport type massacres of innocent bystanders, and the destruction (or attempted destruction) without warning of passenger-carrying aircraft—have most frequently been the province of extremist formations from the Middle East, Europe, and Japan.

For its part, skyjacking reached near epidemic proportions in 1970 only to taper off sharply thereafter. There were, in fact, fewer recorded terrorist skyjackings in all of 1975 than there were in an average month just five years earlier. The dramatic decline in popularity of this particular form of terrorist violence has, however, been partially offset by a rise in equally unsettling barricade and hostage episodes.

Another point brought home by the data presented in Appendix B is that although transnational terrorists have, until recently at least, rarely sought to wring concessions from Washington, American targets—whether human or physical, official or private—have consistently been among the most popular for attack. For example, between mid-1969 and early 1973 (when tightened security and the implications of the US-Cuba agreement made American planes seem less attractive), US aircraft figured in about 30 percent of all skyjackings. Moreover, this ratio is relatively modest in comparison to US experience with some other forms of terrorist activity, especially kidnapping. *Indeed, the available data suggests that over the past eight years, US citizens or US facilities have been victimized in at least one-third of all transnational terrorist incidents.*

The hard fact is that substantial pockets of popular opinion in many parts of the world are prone to identify the US with reaction, intervention, and "neo-colonial" exploitation. Hence, American targets have a high symbolic value for "anti-imperialists" of both



A Classic Example of the Threat to Americans Abroad

On 4 August 1975, a group of Japanese Red Army terrorists seized the adjoining offices of the US Embassy's consular section and the Swedish Embassy in Kuala Lumpur in a successful bid to secure the release of several other terrorists who were then in Japanese custody. The photo shows some of the hostage diplomats being herded onto a bus bound for the waiting JAL jetliner that eventually carried the JRA gunmen and their newly freed compatriots to Libya.

nationalistic and ideological persuasion. Moreover, such targets also tend to have a high "embarrassment quotient" in relation to the governments of the countries in which the attacks occur and, if different, the governments against which the terrorists levy their demands.

Despite their summary nature, the group profiles set forth in Appendix C serve, in part, to document the three additional trends—beginning with the proliferation of active terrorist groups in recent years—that were cited as particularly significant at the outset of this study. For example, even though the criteria employed for selecting the groups included in Appendix C (relative levels of activity or prominence) tended to favor long-lived formations, the majority of the organizations listed therein are less than eight years old. Less evident from the profiles but perhaps more significant is the instability and ephemeral quality that have been characteristic of many if not most of the organizations that have engaged in transnational terrorism over the past decade. The net growth in their numbers has, in fact, been as much attributable to the splintering of old groups as to the emergence of entirely new ones.

The next-mentioned trend—that toward bolder actions—has been uneven. Moreover, its precise contours defy precise definition for they depend on

unavoidably subjective judgments concerning the relative difficulty, risk, and shock value associated with often quite dissimilar incidents. Nevertheless, the inherent dynamics and logic of a campaign of terrorist violence are such that it has a natural propensity to escalate over time. Globally, this has found reflection in the adoption and spread of aggressive new tactics. Locally, it has been manifested in the tendency of



Debris flies through the air as the PFLP commences destruction of the three airliners—worth a total of \$20 million—that it hijacked to Dawson Field, Jordan in early September 1970.

certain groups to probe the effective limits of any such innovation that they elect to employ before scaling back on its use or on their associated demands. Thus we have witnessed:

- the multiple skyjacking operation staged by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in September 1970 which capped the wave of aircraft seizures that had begun two years earlier;*
- the all time record for multiple and cumulative diplomatic kidnappings established by the Tupamaros between mid-1970 and early 1971 in their effort to secure the release of about 150 imprisoned collaborators; and
- the escalation of the amount of ransom demanded by Argentine terrorists for the release of kidnapped multinational corporation executives from \$62,500 in 1971 to a reported figure of over \$60 million in 1975.**

Because of the complexity of the relationships involved, the sensitive nature of much of the available information, and the questions which are raised with respect to the past and present role of various state actors, the third trend—that toward more extensive international cooperation among terrorist groups—deserves detailed examination in a separate research study. Indeed, although a number of notations concerning known or suspected transnational links have been included in the material presented in Appendix C, the broad scope of this paper precludes more than a brief overview of the problem.

So far, at least, the efforts of various terrorist groups to promote broad regional and inter-regional coordination through the holding of periodic conferences and the formation of such umbrella organizations as Latin America's Revolutionary Coordination Junta (JCR) seem to have generated

*See photo on p. 13. In a series of well-coordinated actions (all but one of which were staged during the course of a single day: 6 September 1970), the PFLP hijacked four airliners and attempted to seize a fifth. One plane was flown to Cairo, where it was destroyed as soon as the passengers and crew had disembarked. The other three aircraft were diverted to a landing strip in the Jordanian desert. These were blown up on 12 September, but some of their passengers were held hostage for another 13 to 18 days.

**In the latter case, the Montoneros organization kidnapped Jorge and Juan Born, co-owners and directors of Bunge and Born Ltd., in September 1974 and held them for nine months. An additional condition for their release—which also was met—was the publication in several leading Western papers of a full page political "announcement" drawn up by their captors (see Figure 3).

more smoke than fire.* But at a lower level, a growing network of overlapping *ad hoc* alliances and mutual assistance arrangements have added an ominous new dimension to the terrorist threat.

Although terrorist groups in the Western Hemisphere seem to have been entering the picture more often of late, this phenomenon has been most evident in Europe and the Middle East where the advantages that can be derived from transnational cooperation have brought together some strange bedfellows indeed. For example, support rendered by individuals associated with the anarchist Baader-Meinhof Gang facilitated preparations for the attack on the Israeli Olympic team which was staged by the extremist but relatively non-revolutionary Palestinian Black September Organization in the fall of 1972. Not only have the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Japanese Red Army (JRA) teamed up in a number of dramatic ventures, but—as suggested by the fact that the three Japanese gunmen who executed the Lod Airport massacre in May 1972 carried papers forged in Germany and weapons that they had picked up in Italy—both organizations have received assistance from a number of other terrorist groups in various parts of the world. The Turkish People's Liberation Army has used Palestinian training camp facilities in Syria and has reciprocated by attacking Israeli targets in Turkey. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) has developed links with a number of terrorist organizations outside the UK and Northern Ireland, including separatist groups in France and Spain as well as some Palestinian formations in the Middle East.

Overall, more and more groups throughout the area have begun providing each other with arms, safe housing, and other forms of support. In fact, there is evidence that a European-based terrorist "service industry" has emerged in the form of organizations devoted primarily or exclusively to providing training, documentation, and other specialized assistance to revolutionary and national liberation movements in all corners of the world. Just how complicated this web of interrelationships has become is well illustrated by France's celebrated—but still murky—"Carlos Affair" and its recent dramatic sequel in Vienna (see pages 16-17).

*The JCR is composed of Argentina's Revolutionary People's Army (ERP), Bolivia's National Liberation Army (ELN), Chile's Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), Paraguay's National Liberation Front (FREPALINA), and the remnants of Uruguay's National Liberation Movement (MLN/Tupamaros). Backed by the ERP's overflowing coffers, it has grown more active in recent months and has the potential for becoming an effective and dangerous organization.

Runge and Born Ltd. wishes to clarify that it has been forced to publish this announcement by the imposition of the Organization which holds in its power its executives Jorge and Juan Born. In no circumstances should its publication be

deemed to imply agreement with its content.

In relation to the judgment made by the Organization against the company the following clarifications are in order:

1. In Argentina for the last 10 years salaries have been established by collective wage bargaining committees, with the exception of multinational trade unions.
2. The Company has always respected these agreements. It has been the permanent policy of the company to maintain some levels above those established in the collective agreements.
3. In the areas of its activities the Company pays the highest wages and offers the best working conditions in the country. The highest contractual remuneration is not obtained from the relative trade unions.
4. Leaving aside the fact that the term "multinational monopoly" is not Argentine law, the right to deprive another Argentine of his rights as a citizen.
5. The fact that a Company has a factory in various countries by no means implies that its shareholders or its executives chosen there, own.
6. The Company is the most important one in the Argentine Republic and that which has effected the greatest investments. This can be seen on the question that it has transferred its capital abroad.

7. On the contrary, the Company is the only one in Argentina which exports technology and improves the corresponding results.
8. It has always been the consistent policy of the Company not to invest investments in any country with more developed than another. (In the other hand the Argentine Central Bank has such transfers and the Company respects the law).
9. Person was overthrown in 1955 by a military junta in which the Company neither directly nor indirectly played any part.
10. The Company resolutely opposes any attempt to impose ideas by methods of violence.
11. The Company's film contains correspondence with General Peron which bears ample witness to the high level of respect and esteem felt by the General towards the Company.

"In September, 1974 the Montoneros decided to submit the company Runge y Born to a revolutionary trial. The entire effort relative to the Company's activities were studied from its point of origin up to the present day, both in the country and abroad, and it was decided to make Runge y Born respond to the following charges:

1. Exploitation of the Working Class

For years this company has expanded thanks to the exploitation of its workers, by paying them low salaries and appealing to police repression when mobilizations took place demanding justice in the distribution of profit.

2. Monopolistic Practices

In addition to exploiting its workers the company has used on numerous opportunities with differing devices strengthening maneuvers to liquidate the small and medium sized national company.

3. Aggression against National Interests

In addition to the foregoing Runge y Born has committed permanently attacks against the national interests, through the de-capitalization which it generates by using the profit earned in the country for foreign expansion. Runge y Born has ceased to be a national company to convert itself into a multinational monopoly thanks to exchange irregularities, thinking in the interests of the company and conspiring against the national interest. Additionally the Peronists, linking itself permanently to the illegal governments that succeeded it, places the company in the position of enemy of the Argentine Republic in the political terrain. This fact was clearly demonstrated when the Peronist government came to power on March 11, 1973 by its practice of creating supply shortages to provoke chaos and facilitate the denaturation of the popular triumph.

With the object of carrying out the trial the Montoneros realized a military operation and proceeded to detain Jorge and Juan Born, both owners and directors of the company. Following extensive interrogation and an analysis of the magnitude of the responsibility of the company in the charges formulated the Montoneros imposed on Runge y Born the following penalties:

- a) One year's prison for Jorge and Juan Born. Later commuted to 9 months when the company fulfilled the remainder of the obligations.
- b) Payment of a very large sum in dollars as bail for the freeing of Jorge and Juan Born, and fine for the crime of exchange irregularities, this sum being handed over to the Montoneros as the representatives of the national interest and to whose uses it will be applied.
- c) The delivery in townships, factories, schools and hospitals of merchandise in a value of 1,000,000 dollars as punishment for the supply shortages the company inflicted on the people.
- d) Immediate solution of the union conflicts produced during the period of imprisonment of both directors, accepting the demands of the workers.
- e) As retribution for the affront to the Argentine people that its participation in the 1955 coup d'etat represented, the placing in all its factories in the country of a bust of both General Peron and Eva Peron, granting the workers authorization to suspend activities and effect acts of homage when these are unveiled.
- f) The placing of the present announcement on the notice boards of these factories, exhibiting it for a period of 15 days.

This operation of the Montoneros constitutes one of the most transcendental political events of the country and is effected in the context of a situation really dramatic for the Argentine People.

10 YEARS OF ANTI IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE

During the last 10 years our people have been waging a heroic struggle against imperialism and its local allies. The national interests against those of imperialism, the forces which fight for liberty combating those that favor dependence. Imperialism or the Nation. Dependence or Liberation—these define the principal terms of the confrontation. One of the most important elements in this long fight is the emergence of the Peronist movement as the political identity of the Working Class and small urban and rural producers, and as the organizational framework inside which the people engages in its global battle against the monopolistic interests.

The struggle against the pro-imperialist coup d'etat which in 1955 overthrew Peron, the popular resistance which the people carried out for 18 years against the successive variants with which the system tried to frustrate the popular will, the recent popular triumph that on 11th March 1973 terminated the Military Dictatorship of General Lanusse—these had as their central protagonist and the unifying axis of all sectors of the nation the Peronist Movement led from exile by General Peron.

Some of these 18 years of resistance, matured by multiple popular struggles, as the expression of the highest levels of confrontation and as a synthesis of this long experience, there evolved the armed organizations of Peronism which then converged into the present politico-military organization of the Montoneros.

All methods were tried by imperialism to destroy the Peronist Movement as the Movement for National Liberation: persecution, gail, torture, shootings, exile—these clashed against a movement which maintained its unity around General Peron and which was intransigent in defense of the popular interests.

With its attempts at destruction a failure, imperialism fell back on the ploy of joining the regime, trying to convert it into a liberal structure that co-exists inside the system, employing it of its content of the masses, denying it of its revolutionary essence and destroying it as the Movement of National Liberation. It prepared and promoted a double strategy: through bribery, infiltration, ideological penetration, the incorporation into the very economic structure of monopolies—through these, imperialism began to spawn a layer of business, union and political leaders who abandoned the defense of the interests of the Peronist people to convert themselves into the instrument of the imperialist strategy for the destruction of the Peronist Movement as the Movement for National Liberation; traitors to the fatherland and the movement, the supporters of the monopolistic interests, these sectors chose in the confrontation the battle camp of the dependents. Simultaneously they savagely repressed all those leaders, militants and agitators who continued loyal to the interest of the working class and the people, and who, faithful to the fatherland and the movement, never abandoned the war for Liberation. There is involved on "institutional" Peronism, empty of the masses and full of traitors who accept flexibly the rules of play of the system at the same time that they attempt to annihilate the Authentic Peronism.

THE REASON AGAINST THE POPULAR TRIUMPH OF 11th MARCH 1973

Following the popular triumph of 11th March 1973 the imperialist strategy maintained these principles and, far from confronting globally the Peronist government, proposed as its objective detaching from that triumph depositing from the government structures the authentic Peronists and filling them little by little with the traitors. With General Peron dead, this strategy entered into its final phase, and in a few months one of the greatest of popular triumphs has been transformed into one of the most disastrous, repressive and pro-imperialist governments that the Argentine people has had to endure.

From the 11th of March 1973 nothing remains, neither Peron as head of the Movement, nor Campora as President, neither the provincial governments, nor the Ministers nor even the program voted for by people. A small group lustful for power, pivots of the imperialist strategy, has been accumulating in it and has the control of the institutional apparatus of the Peronist Movement and the Government. From there they defend the interests of the monopolies vaulting the shirt of Peronism. They consist of the President Isabel Martinez, Minister Lopez Rega, Raul Alfaro, President of the Chamber of Deputies, with all their unconditional followers.

Increasingly the country is bankrupt, virtually in crisis. The inflation has reached a rate of 10% per month and already the people have lost the capacity to shock. The real wage of the workers, continually deteriorating, makes it necessary to perform acrobatics to survive; investment is zero, there is no offtake of the labor force, and unemployment aggravates the decline in salaries; the external debt has climbed from 6,500 million dollars in 1974 to 1,100 million today; the balance of payments is in deficit, the hard currency reserves fall alarmingly daily; the devaluation of the Argentine currency is really outstanding—in six months the black market dollar has tripled in value, small and medium-sized industry is being liquidated. The world crisis of capitalism is thrown onto the shoulders of the dependent countries, so that the multi-national monopolies may save themselves from the disaster the Argentine people will, together with the other dependent countries, suffer the consequences.

The complement of this economic policy is a repression that has no parallels in the recent history of the country. With the objective of annihilating a popular government, which governs nourishing itself on the majority and with the consent of the minority, it is necessary to adopt every kind of opposition to it justified or not. The most advanced repressive legislation has been imposed, making possible the joint action of the forces of repression headed by the armed forces. Completing this institutionalized repressive machinery there has been mounted from the very government the paramilitary organization, A.A., which has committed hundreds of savage assassinations with total impunity. Integrated by police, military and mercenaries, it imposes the politics of terror, blasting with bullets, dynamiting and setting on fire the popular militants, journalists, political leaders, priests, etc. At the head of this repressive machinery the Minister of Social Welfare Jose Lopez Rega pretends in his madness for power to emulate Hitler of Nazi Germany. Similar in his methodology, Lopez Rega aspires to the control of all the apparatus of repression to invest himself with power and will never rest till he achieves his objectives.

Apart from repressing those who confront the government, there is necessary, the silence of the press. To that legislation which chokes the freedom of expression to the closure of newspapers and magazines, there are added threats, persecution and the assassination of those journalists who dare to make any criticism or simply gather the truth and publish it. To the censure imposed by law there is added the autocensure which terror imposes upon the media.

In the face of all this the majority of the liberal political leaders—where Dr. Ricardo Balbin stands out—play at "constructive opposition based on dialogue and respect for the institutions". Masters of all the skills to make the popular struggles their own without ever representing their interest, these gentlemen prefer to talk silent or speak ambiguously rather than provoke a confrontation they cannot control. They defend the same interests as the government, they differ in that they are liberals, they disagree with the way in which the present policies—with which essentially they agree—are implemented only because they are left to the side in the execution. Enemies of the process of National Liberation, they are allies of the imperialist strategy of annihilating the Authentic Peronism to frustrate the organization of the Working Class and the People to castrate the revolutionary process.

ONLY THE PEOPLE WILL SAVE THE PEOPLE

To overcome this critical situation into which the country has been dragged we cannot count on any nationalist coup d'etat or anything similar: the Armed Forces will never defend the popular interests and at every moment they prove this. Nor can we hope that the most distinguished liberal political leaders abandon their posture of many years of emulating the regime, helping to leave the people isolated from the decisions. The most heroic defenders of the "democratic institutions"—always provided these serve to continue in a state of dependence—they have no hesitation in supporting constantly more this totalitarian government.

Today more than ever before there is fulfilled the pronouncement of General Peron: "Only the People can save the People".

The Montoneros have accepted the historic challenge. To continue the process of National and Social Liberation has a concrete meaning, one path only is follow. It implies deepening a process which can only be consistent to the extent it is hegemonized by the Working Class. Which will be possible when we construct a Popular Power which liquidates the political, military and economic power of the imperialism which will be definitive when we destroy the dependence on capitalism and construct socialism. We assume the responsibility of the moment and we commit all our forces to:

1. Reconstruct the Peronist Movement as the authentic expression of the interests of the Working Class and the People avoiding that these are destroyed by treason. The Authentic Peronism will arise from this crisis strengthened by its experience of struggle, converted into the Movement of National Liberation by means of which the People will wage its definitive war against imperialism.
2. To promote the construction of the National Liberation Front which, led by the Peronist Movement, joins together in the fight for National Liberation small and medium sized businessmen and all those sectors which are in contradiction with imperialism.
3. To continue without truce the resistance to the present government, laying bare its anti-popular, repressive and pro-imperialist essence, attacking without respite the forces that sustain it until we achieve its annihilation.

PERON OR DEATH

LONG LIVE THE FATHERLAND

UNTIL VICTORY MY CENTRAL
MONTONEROS

By the People for the People

Figure 3. The notice inserted in the Washington Post by Runge and Born Ltd. as a condition for the release of Jorge and Juan Born

THE SAGA OF CARLOS

Guided by a Lebanese guerrilla-turned-informer named Michel Moukarbel, three French counterintelligence agents in Paris attempted to bring in a suspected terrorist—a man known to them only by his cover name of Carlos—for questioning on the evening of 27 June 1975. Inexplicably, they were unarmed. Carlos was not. He escaped in a blaze of gunfire that left Moukarbel and two of the French security officers dead at the scene. The third French agent was gravely wounded.



A French police photo of Carlos in Paris

Carlos vanished—leaving a thoroughly shaken French security service behind him—only to reappear as the leader of the group of terrorists that successfully took almost all the delegates to an OPEC ministerial-level conference in Vienna hostage on 21 December 1975. He remains something of a man of mystery. But during the months between his hasty exit from Paris and his dramatic return to the limelight, enough evidence documenting—or hinting at—remarkably extensive terrorist activities and connections was uncovered to make him seem like a real life “Juckul.” The first piece in the jigsaw puzzle was furnished by a chance break in London that enabled the British to identify Carlos as Illich Ramirez-Sanchez, the 25-


year-old son of a wealthy and staunchly Communist Venezuelan lawyer who had dispatched his family to London in 1966.

Carlos' early political career was highlighted by a brief stint at the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow—from whence he was reportedly expelled for dissolute living and improper attitudes in early 1970. Little is known of Carlos' movements in the wake of his unscheduled departure from the USSR. In any event, more than a year was to pass before he returned to London, and he apparently spent at least part of this period in the Middle East. At some point in the early 1970s, he became a member of the extensive terrorist network operated by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)—a fact openly acknowledged by a PFLP spokesman in July 1975 with the boastful addition that Carlos and Moukarbel had been planning a series of dramatic new actions when the French authorities finally closed in on them.

Painstaking investigation of Carlos' known associates subsequently revealed that, in addition to Moukarbel (described by the PFLP as its “Paris paymaster”), he had been working with a mixed entourage of dedicated revolutionaries that included several Latin Americans. One of the latter has been further identified as a member of the secretariat of the Colombian Communist Party. Carlos had also been provided with shelter and other helpful services by a number of women friends, including at least two European nationals, who probably had little knowledge of what he was really doing.


Charged, in general terms, with striking at “Zionism and imperialism,” the Carlos organization had apparently been given latitude to operate over a wide geographic area embracing not only the UK and much of Continental Europe but, according to plans recovered by British authorities, parts of the Middle East as well. Moreover, evidence in the form of records that had been maintained by Moukarbel and the nature of some of the weapons that Carlos had left for safekeeping with friends in England and France established that the group had been cooperating, in keeping with PFLP policy, with a number of other terrorist groups—most notably the Japanese Red Army (JRA) and the German Baader-Meinhof Gang. It now seems certain, for example, that Carlos and Moukarbel were deeply involved in the planning of the JRA seizure of the French Embassy in The Hague in September 1974.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: OCT 2001



ABOVE: The Soviet-made RPG-7 rocket launcher used by members of Carlos' group in their abortive attack on an El Al plane at Orly airport outside Paris on 13 January 1975

BELOW: A French policeman points to the hole in the fuselage of the Yugoslav airliner that was hit by one of the rocket grenades fired at the El Al plane




Other headline incidents to which Carlos has been linked since his near arrest in France include an assassination attempt against J. Edward Sieff (a prominent English Jew and clothing-store magnate) in December 1973; the bombing of a popular Paris Left Bank hangout, Le Drugstore, in 1974; two attacks against El Al aircraft at Orly Airport in January 1975; and an assassination attempt against a Yugoslav consular official in Lyons in March 1975. Extras or principals from other terrorist organizations were involved in some of these as well. To what extent, if any, that state actors may also have taken a hand

unknown. But Cuban officials had been maintaining contact with members of the Carlos group in both England and France, and the French were sufficiently suspicious of this activity to send three of Havana's diplomats packing in the wake of Carlos' escape.

Since 1974, at least, the group that Carlos had headed in Paris had generally identified itself as the "Mohammed Boudia Commando." When he reappeared in Vienna in December 1975, it was at the head of a seemingly new formation with a different name (the "Arm of the Arab Revolution") and, possibly, a different principal sponsor. (The PFLP has denied responsibility for the OPEC operation; so too has Libya, but the Egyptians, among others, have openly accused Colonel Qaddafi of being behind it.) In any event, the composition of Carlos' Vienna attack force (believed to have consisted, in addition to its Venezuelan leader, of two Germans and three Palestinians) provided solid new evidence of the trend toward closer cooperation among terrorists of different nationalities.

As of this writing, Carlos' whereabouts are again unknown. Nor are the returns on his December venture as yet all in. It remains to be seen, for example, just what new international counter-measures—if any—will result from that action. Nevertheless, the immediate outcome of Carlos' OPEC operation (including safe haven for the terrorists and massive publicity for their objectives)—coupled with his boast that he currently controls some two-score seasoned professionals—suggests that the world will hear from him again before too long.



The hostages taken in Carlos' attack on the OPEC ministerial-level conference in Vienna on 21 December 1975. The Austrian Airlines DC-9 that flew them and the Yugoslav Aerotransport to Algiers (with a side trip to Tripoli)

Why?

The commonalities, differences, or changes in patterns of behavior that have been described thus far are, of course, attributable to the interplay of a host of variables. Only a few of these, i.e., the ones that seem to have had the greatest direct bearing on the timing, scope, and nature of the *internationalization* of terror, are addressed at any length below. No attempt is made to develop some sort of model or overarching theory with respect to this phenomenon. Far more modest, the objective here is simply to ascertain to what extent the current rash of transnational (and, to a lesser degree, international) terrorist activity is attributable to broad regional and global trends and developments as opposed to unique and possibly transitory local problems and circumstances.

A few general observations—some of them, perhaps self-evident—are needed to set the problem in perspective and to lay the groundwork for further analysis. First of all, *transnational terrorism* is by nature more congenial to urban than to rural-based groups and is thus characteristically spawned by societies at a mid to advanced stage of socio-economic development. Resort to *international terrorism*, on the other hand, is just as likely to result from calculations concerning the relative efficacy of alternative methods for bringing national power to bear in a given situation as from an outright dearth of national resources. Hence, such behavior is not the special province of any particular category of state.

Modern-day practitioners of transnational terrorism have benefited from a generally permissive international environment—a point which will be elaborated below. For the most part, therefore, the *constraints* on their behavior have either been a function of local environmental factors affecting their objective capabilities, opportunities, and alternatives or have been self-imposed for tactical or philosophical reasons.

These latter restraints are, of course, uncertain, for personal predilections can be overshadowed by frustration or desperation. Nevertheless, as evidenced by the data presented in Appendices B and C, *cultural heritage* has been a key factor affecting individual terrorist groups' perceptions of the limits beyond which the level or intensity of violence is likely to become counterproductive. Moreover, although generalization is difficult because the ideological mix is different in almost every case, so has what is here termed the group's *credo* or *ethos*. The sharp differences in behavior between the two wings of the

IRA and among the various Palestinian terrorist groups are evidence enough of this. But far more research is needed before confident judgments will be possible with respect to just what combinations of beliefs are most likely to foster repeated resort to extreme and indiscriminate forms of violence.

Since the extent and efficacy of internal security controls bear heavily on the frequency, form, and domestic impact of transnational terrorist incidents in any given country, *the proliferation of this form of political violence has both contributed to and fed upon the recent trend toward more widespread resort to various forms of authoritarian rule*. On one hand, open societies and weak or permissive authoritarian regimes are particularly vulnerable to such activity—and to its domestic ramifications. On the other, rigid and forceful authoritarian rule can foster transitional terrorism by forcing dissidents to operate abroad.

Together with earlier references to the basic societal problems that can give rise to various forms of political violence, the foregoing observations focus on the human and local environmental factors affecting the extent, nature, and domestic impact of transnational or international terrorist activity in different parts of the world. The question remains, however, as to just why there has been such a marked and enduring upsurge in transnational terrorism over the past eight years. In part, this phenomenon is attributable to a war-punctuated regional conflict affecting the interests of a large number of nations and attended by particularly deep-seated feelings of bitterness and frustration. But it would not have grown to its present dimensions were it not for the concurrent convergence and acceleration of a number of changes in the global environment that had been taking shape much earlier.

These trends are difficult to disaggregate. Technological advance, growing global interdependence, and the increasing urgency attached to forced draft modernization in many parts of the world are, for example, closely interrelated. But each bears brief comment.

The impact of *new technology* on terrorist capabilities with respect to weapons, mobility, and tactical communications has already been cited. As evidenced by the development of ever more sophisticated letter bombs, the occasional employment of missiles, and the staging of coordinated actions in widely separated locations, it has been significant. But whatever the nature of a

terrorist act or the means of its execution, it must be remembered that the role of the media is critical to the spreading and intensification of its psychological impact. Hence, among all the technological advances in recent years, the development of *satellite communications*, and in particular, their upgrading in 1968 to include a television capability have unquestionably been among the most important in making transnational activity seem attractive to terrorist groups.

The advent of satellite communications has also fed and underscored the thickening network of political, economic, and technological dependencies and obligations now commonly subsumed under the rubric of *interdependence*. Whether or not this term has been abused of late, the growth in both the numbers and importance of international, transnational, and (as a consequence of the centralizing imperatives of local modernization efforts) subnational linkages over the past decade has had at least a two-fold impact on the world-wide potential for terrorism. On the one hand, it has created a host of new, vulnerable, and potentially highly disruptive targets for terrorist attack (e.g., commercial and communications centers, transportation hubs, international power grids and pipelines, super tankers, and jumbo aircraft). On the other, it has generated a sort of identity crisis that has been reflected in a troublesome countervailing upsurge of nationalism and ethnicity.

For their part, the many other strains and dislocations associated with *the process of modernizing change* have swelled the ranks of the alienated in many parts of the world. They have also added millions of emigre workers to the international pool of political exiles and refugees which terrorists can exploit for cover, recruits, and various forms of operational support.

The upsurge in transnational terrorism has also been aided and abetted by a "*revolutionary*" turn in *the overall political environment* somewhat reminiscent of that experienced about 200 years ago. The postwar order has, in fact, come under challenge from all sides: from the developing nations of the Third World; from "maverick" Communist regimes; from dissatisfied second rank powers; and from a broad array of social forces fired, with differing degrees of responsibility, by a new sense of "social conscience."

By late 1967, the potential for a general escalation of political violence was clear. Viewed in this context, the Palestinians' dramatic entry into the air piracy

business in 1968 becomes something of a logical if unexpected extension of a chain of developments that had included the emergence of the unruly New Left, a further proliferation of violence-prone splinter groups, and the first indications of the general post-Guevara shift in emphasis from rural to urban guerrilla warfare in Latin America.*

The characteristics and contours of this "revolutionary atmosphere" have undergone some change in the intervening years. The salience of some of the original contributory issues, e.g., Vietnam, has faded. But, as amply illustrated by the increasingly sympathetic treatment accorded to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and other international forums over the past 18 months, that of the new moral, political, and economic standards championed by the Third World has not.** On the contrary, now backed by the new political clout of the Arab oil states, these values appear to be gaining in force. In short, the established postwar international political system has been cast into something of a state of flux—with all that that implies with respect to its effective order-keeping capabilities.

Terrorists have benefited from this overall state of affairs in many ways. Among other things, it has:

- Accorded an aura of legitimacy to the acts of any terrorist group claiming leftist revolutionary or national liberation movement status;
- Frustrated efforts to develop more effective international countermeasures;
- Facilitated transnational contact and cooperation among terrorist groups;
- Fostered a significant increase in the number of national, transnational, and international organizations providing national liberation movements and other "progressive" dissident

*With Guevara's demise and subsequent decline in stature as a revolutionary theorist and tactician, the works of such leading advocates of terrorist violence as Fannon, Satre, and Marighela have assumed increasing importance as a major literary source of inspiration for ultra militants in many parts of the world.

**The PLO is a political umbrella organization embracing several Fedayeen commando groups. It was accorded recognition as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people (at the expense of Jordan) by the 1974 "Islamic nonaligned" and Rabat summit meetings. In November of that same year, it was granted observer status by the UNGA. All told, some 50 states have allowed the PLO to open offices in their capitals. In addition, five UN-affiliated international agencies (ILO, WHO, UPU, ITU, and UNESCO) have granted it observer status.

formations with various forms of direct and indirect support.

The attitudes and behavior of supportive states—ranging from those willing to provide little more than kind words and occasional safe haven to those that regularly furnish practicing or potential terrorists with funds, arms, training, documentation, and other operational support—have constituted another key global environmental factor affecting the scope and nature of transnational terrorist activity during the period under review. *Variable* might be a better term, however, for the extent of such assistance has fluctuated with changing appreciations of broader interests on the part of the state actors involved. For example, 1975 witnessed a distinct downward trend in such support.

In any event, if one excludes the simply indulgent or indifferent (including those liberal Western European states like France and Switzerland that, because of their strategic location and the extensive protection they accord to democratic rights and freedoms, have become involuntary hosts to all manner of foreign dissident groups) the list of nations in question dwindles to less than a score. Counting a few states that have recently retired—or partially retired—from the business, these “activists” include (but are not limited to) Libya, Cuba, the USSR, China, North Korea, Algeria, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, Tanzania, Congo, Zaire, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and, however reluctant it has been to engage in such activity, Lebanon.

In some of these states, most of the support rendered to foreign revolutionary or guerrilla formations has been directed toward influencing the course of developments in one or two neighboring states or territories. And for many, perhaps most, the actual promotion of terrorist violence has been no more than a largely unintended byproduct of their activities. Nevertheless, in one way or another, all of them have directly contributed to the recent upsurge of transnational terrorism.

Two or three bear special mention. Take Libya, for example. The oil-rich Qaddafi regime has for some years been the world’s most unabashed governmental proponent of revolutionary violence. And from the number of times that Libya has been linked to specific terrorist groups and incidents—including Carlos’ raid on the OPEC meeting in Vienna—it would appear that Colonel Qaddafi has also been one of the world’s least inhibited practitioners of international terrorism.

Tripoli’s focus has been on nationalist formations, whatever their ideological coloration or religious leanings. Thus, the recipients of its favors (in the form of various combinations of financial, logistical, and technical support) have been numerous and varied. In addition to some of the more militant Palestinian splinter groups, they have included the Irish Republican Army and a number of less widely known guerrilla movements based in the Philippines, Ethiopia, Somalia, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, Chad, Morocco, Tunisia, Thailand, and Panama.

This list is not exhaustive. Moreover, it bodes well to grow since, despite Tripoli’s professions of reluctance to grant safe haven to the JRA terrorists who seized the American Consulate General in Kuala Lumpur in August 1975, there have as yet been no convincing indications that Colonel Qaddafi has undergone a change of heart.

Moscow’s posture has been more ambiguous. Basically, the Soviets have had serious misgivings about the utility of transnational terrorist activity. They have repeatedly warned that excessive violence can tarnish the reputation of those involved and have stressed their belief that such tactics are not only generally unproductive but can lead to unforeseen and possibly uncontrollable adverse consequences. At the same time, however, the Kremlin’s broader interests—including, importantly, those stemming from its continuing adversary relationship with Peking—have denied it the option of a straightforward hands-off policy. Thus, after a period of hesitancy, the Soviets began channelling funds, weapons, and other assistance to fedayeen groups through a number of intermediaries in 1969. All indications are that they continue to do so today.* Similarly, they have continued their long-standing program (the more innocuous aspects of which are publicly associated with Moscow’s Patrice Lumumba University) of bringing young revolutionaries from all parts of the Third World to the Soviet Union for training and indoctrination. And like Carlos, some of these individuals have subsequently cropped up on the transnational terrorist scene.

There is also a considerable body of *circumstantial* evidence linking Moscow to various terrorist formations in Western Europe. That some linkages

*In their commentary on fedayeen activities, however, the Soviets have consistently been careful to distinguish between “permissible” attacks on “legitimate” targets inside Israel and “regrettable” incidents involving noncombatant third parties.

exist may, in fact, be taken for granted, for the broad considerations cited above give the Soviets ample reason for selectively attempting to monitor, penetrate, and gain some influence over such groups. But for obvious reasons, they have had to be very circumspect. They seem, for example, to have relied more heavily there than anywhere else on the cooperation of intermediaries who, if exposed, can be plausibly represented as having acted on their own initiative. In any event, the only hard evidence of Warsaw Pact member assistance to individuals associated with the Baader-Meinhof Gang points to Pankow and Prague. The arms destined for the non-Marxist Provisional Wing of the IRA that were seized at Schiphol Airport in Holland in late 1971 were of Czechoslovak origin and had been handled by a Czechoslovak firm. Even in the original "Carlos Affair," Cuba was the state actor most directly implicated. In short, the true dimensions of Soviet involvement remain extremely difficult to ascertain.

Nonetheless, one thing is clear. However much the Soviets might wish otherwise, their efforts to gain some handle on extremist activity have, together with their pursuit of less congruent objectives, done more to aggravate than to contain the current rash of transnational terrorist activity. The hard fact is that it is difficult to translate assistance into leverage or control when there are other available sources of support. Indeed, as the Soviets should by now have learned, any assistance provided to an extremist group under these circumstances risks simply increasing the recipient's potential for autonomous action.

A third actor deserving of separate comment is Cuba—not so much because of the extent of Havana's past activities in support of revolution and rebellion, but because there is mounting evidence (such as the statement issued at the conclusion of the regional Communist conference which was hosted by the Cubans in June 1975) that Castro's ambiguous policies have finally undergone a fundamental change in this regard. After years of hedging, the Cubans have now publicly espoused Moscow's recommended *via pacifica* strategy with respect to revolutionary struggle in Latin America—a development which bodes ill for those smaller militant formations that still rely heavily on Cuban support. It would appear that they will have to fall in line or face the risk of extinction. But many of Latin America's more active proponents of armed struggle are less vulnerable to Cuban retrenchment. Some are already highly self-sufficient. Of the remainder, those who are unable to tap the enormous war chests that have been accumulated by Argentine

terrorist groups are likely to engage in more frequent ransom and resupply operations of their own. Partly because of this, and partly because Castro has made it abundantly clear that he does not intend to effect a parallel cutback in his support of armed revolutionary struggle outside of Latin America, the impact of Cuba's new posture on the overall level of transnational terrorism may be minimal.

The last and most elusive global variable to be addressed here is the *overall economic environment*. It can impact on the problem of terrorism in a number of subtle and, in some cases, countervailing ways. For example, *extra-cyclical world-wide economic strains*—such as those generated by the sudden quadrupling of oil prices—can so overtax the capabilities of local regimes as to invite domestic violence of a sort that could easily spill over national boundaries. Short of this, they can contribute to a general undercurrent of unrest by curtailing the resources that can be devoted to ameliorating societal ills.

Because the social and political effects of *cyclical trends* in the overall economic climate tend to be delayed and uneven, the potential consequences of short-term fluctuations do not lend themselves to generalization. Medium- to long-term trends, however, can affect both the potential and the opportunities for transnational terrorist activity in any given area. In so far as it affects industrialized countries, *rising economic prosperity* can, for example, facilitate the undetected movement of terrorist groups by fostering a heavy flow of tourist and commercial travel. It also attracts the large aggregations of emigre workers that not only make it easier for foreign terrorists to escape notice but provide a ready pool of manpower for their operational teams and support mechanisms. More broadly, a prolonged and general economic upturn can increase local potentials for political violence by causing popular expectations to far outpace governmental capacities to deliver. And in more affluent societies, at least, the attendant emphasis on materialistic values can alienate significant segments of the student and intellectual communities. Indeed, a combination of these last two destabilizing trends contributed, together with the factors cited earlier, to the emergence of a distinctly "revolutionary" political atmosphere in the late 1960s.

Conversely, a *prolonged economic decline* (something which some observers predict the world will experience for the next 20 years or more) has

generally tended to dampen revolutionary ardor. Popular expectations decline, and people everywhere are preoccupied with the exigencies of day-to-day existence. But the world has much changed since its last broad economic slide. Whether the numbing effects of generalized adversity will be felt as strongly in the future is thus open to question. Their potential impact on the level of transnational terrorist activity is even more uncertain. The actors engaged therein are scarcely representative of the general population. They are few in number and elitist by nature. And given the proven strength of their convictions, they are likely to be among the most resistant to the psychological effects of untoward changes in the overall economic environment.

How Cost Effective?

The answer to this question depends on the vantage point of the observer. The achievement of disproportionately large effects from the employment of minimal resources is, of course, what political terrorism is all about. Its most serious drawback is that its consequences are, as the Soviets maintain, to a considerable degree unpredictable. It can alienate those groups whose sympathy was sought. Rather than disorient the masses, it can rally them to a previously unpopular government. It can galvanize a weak or wavering government into forceful counteraction. In short, tactical successes can, as in Jordan in 1970 and Uruguay in 1970-72, lead to strategic reverses of major proportions.

This risk is, however, easily accepted by those who dispose of no effective alternative methods for achieving their goals. Moreover, despite a number of sobering experiences, the overall balance sheet thus far provides the practitioners of transnational terrorism with grounds for considerable optimism.

Briefly put, the record shows that both transnational and international terrorists have generally been successful in avoiding capture (or, if caught, in escaping punishment) and in meeting at least some of their proximate objectives. For example, in a study of 63 major kidnapping and barricade operations executed between early 1968 and late 1974, the RAND Corporation concluded that such actions were subject to the following probabilities of risk and success:

- 87 percent probability of actually seizing hostages;
- 79 percent chance that *all* members of the terrorist team would escape punishment or death, whether or not they successfully seized hostages;

- 40 percent chance that all or some demands would be met in operations where something more than just safe passage or exit permission was demanded;
- 29 percent chance of full compliance with such demands;
- 83 percent chance of success where safe passage or exit, for the terrorists themselves or for others, was the sole demand;
- 67 percent chance that, if concessions to the principal demands were rejected, all or virtually all members of the terrorist team could still escape alive by going underground, accepting safe passage in lieu of their original demands, or surrendering to a sympathetic government; and
- virtually a 100 percent probability of gaining major publicity whenever that was one of the terrorists' goals.*

Such hostage operations have resulted in the freeing of large numbers of prisoners, the payment of huge ransoms, and in one case where Austria was targeted, the changing of government policy. Until mid-1974, at least, the record for skyjacking was fully comparable. Out of 127 terrorist attempts to seize aircraft between March 1968 and early July 1974, only a dozen were abortive. Of the remainder, less than 10 are known for certain to have ended in the death or imprisonment of the terrorists. In a great majority of cases through 1972, the skyjackers were successful in securing full compliance with their demands. Thereafter, however, they generally received no more than safe haven, and for the past year and a half, skyjacking has been a distinctly losing proposition. Of the 6 attempts made between late July 1974 and the end of 1975, 4 were nipped in the bud and the other 2 brought sentences of death or life in prison to the terrorists involved.

Terrorist acts lacking a bargaining dimension (e.g., bombings and assassinations) have generally entailed a correspondingly lower degree of risk. All told, only about 267 individuals associated with transnational terrorist activity have been caught in the past five years. Of these, 39 were freed without punishment, 58 escaped punishment by getting safe conduct to another country, 16 were released from confinement

*As excerpted in *Terroristic Activity—International Terrorism: Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Fourth Congress, First Session; Part 4; May 14, 1975* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 240.



One Barricade and Hostage Operation That Went Awry

On 24 April 1975, a group of West German terrorists identifying themselves as members of the Holger Mainz Commando seized the FRG Embassy in Stockholm in a bloody and abortive attempt to force Bonn to release 26 individuals associated with the Baader-Meinhof organization from jail. When their demands were refused, the terrorists dynamited the top story of the embassy building in an equally unsuccessful effort to cover their escape. The photo shows the embassy burning in the background as Swedish police carry off one of the captured terrorists.

on the demand of fellow terrorists, 50 were released after serving out their prison terms, and 104 were still in jails as of mid-September 1975. The average sentence meted out to those terrorists who have actually stood trial has been 18 months.*

How Disruptive?

The human and material toll exacted by transnational and international terrorist violence over the past eight years has been relatively low. For example, although the total cost of such activity in terms of ransom payments and property damage has never been tallied, all indications are that it falls far short of the half billion dollars loss suffered to school vandals in the US each year.

Closer track has been kept of the human casualties involved. Latest estimates place these at about 800 killed and 1,700 wounded—including the losses incurred by the terrorists themselves. To put these

figures in better perspective, consider the fact that they fall somewhat short of the total casualties attributable to domestic terrorism in Northern Ireland alone during the same period or that Argentine terrorists and "counterterrorists" have managed to kill more than 1,000 of their countrymen since mid-1974. For a starker contrast, take Vietnam. There, in one year (1968), Viet Cong terrorists were credited with assassinating 6,000 people and wounding 16,000 more. Comparisons with "normal" levels of domestic violence in the US may also be useful. There were, for example, about 20,000 homicides—and more than 2,000 bombings—recorded here in 1975.

The juxtaposition of these statistics suggests that the dimensions of the problem posed by transnational and international terrorism are still quite small and that the increase in such activity since 1968, while marked, should have done little to undermine world order. But the disruptive impact of these terrorist incidents and campaigns has been magnified by the publicity they have received and by their interaction with other destabilizing trends and forces. Thus, while the terrorists have made no revolutions and, by

*"Terrorism: Growing and Increasingly Dangerous," (Interview with Robert A. Fearey, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism), *U.S. News and World Report*, 29 September 1975, p. 79.

DATELINE:

HIGHLIGHTS OF A YEAR-END AND INTERNATIONAL

- **2 DECEMBER:** South Molluccan Terrorists Seize a Dutch Train



South Molluccan terrorists pick up supplies outside the train that they held for 12 days before surrendering to Dutch authorities.

- **4 DECEMBER:** South Molluccan Terrorists Seize the Indonesian Consulate in Amsterdam

A blindfolded and tethered hostage is displayed on a third floor balcony of the Indonesian Consulate on 5 December—a full two weeks before his South Molluccan captors finally laid down their arms and surrendered.



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DECEMBER 1975

UPSURGE IN MAJOR TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS

- **21 DECEMBER:** The Carlos-Led "Arm of the Arab Revolution" Attacks the OPEC Ministers' Meeting in Vienna



Wounded in the assault on OPEC's Vienna headquarters, a terrorist is carried off to the hospital. The following day, he was placed on board the plane that carried the rest of his group and 43 of their hostages to North Africa.

- **21 DECEMBER:** An American Employee of a US Firm is Kidnapped in Ethiopia by Eritrean Terrorists

- **23 DECEMBER:** A US Embassy Official is Gunned Down by Unidentified Terrorists in Athens

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			

22 Days of Terror: The overlapping periods of direct terrorist violence associated with the five incidents cited here spanned almost the whole month of December.

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themselves at least, toppled no governments, they have:

- Embarrassed several governments and contributed to the effective collapse of a few (e.g., the initial Bordaberry Administration in Uruguay and the Isabel Peron regime in Argentina);
- Added an abrasive new dimension to both North-South and East-West relations;
- Contributed to the growing international status and fortunes of the PLO;
- Compelled some nations to temporarily abandon their law enforcement function (e.g., to release captured terrorists) out of fear of future retribution;
- Aggravated and accentuated the dilemmas generated within the existing international system by the emergence of a growing company of powerful non-state actors;
- Introduced strains in relations among those Western nations which, because of divergent national interests, feel constrained to adopt differing positions with respect to specific incidents or broader terrorist-related issues;
- Reinforced the currently pervasive sense of global flux and disorder;
- Caused a large number of nations, including the US, to divert substantial resources to defense against terrorist attacks;*
- Adversely affected the quality of life in many open or formerly open societies.

*In the US, this has been reflected most clearly in the installation of an effective but costly airport security system and, following the Khartoum incident of 1973, in a supplemental \$20 million appropriation provided to the Department of State for the sole purpose of improving the security of American diplomatic and consular installations abroad. The construction of a special bomb-proof courthouse in which to try the captured leaders of the Baader-Meinhof Gang was one of the more notable extra expenses that have been incurred by Bonn. By the time these proceedings are over, it is estimated that they will have cost the West German taxpayer more than \$6 million. Even the liberal Swedes have become nervous since incurring the wrath of the JRA in March 1975 by arresting two members of that group and deporting them to Japan. In any event, they chose to take no chances when they hosted the Chilean Davis Cup tennis team some six months later. They converted the fashionable coastal resort where the matches were held into a veritable fortress protected by floodlights; fences up to 35 feet high; and a 1,300-man police force equipped with gunboats, helicopters, scores of dogs, and some 50 horses.

In short, while scarcely cataclysmic, the spoiling effects of modern-day transnational and international terrorism have been substantial. Harking back to earlier discussion, this state of affairs is both a measure and, in large part, a consequence of increasing global interdependence. As the dimensions and complexity of the web of interstate and transnational linkages that together comprise the functional core of the "international system" have grown under the impact of technological advance, the reverberations of events—including terrorist attacks—which disturb or threaten its more important intersections have tended to become increasingly widespread and sharply felt. At the same time, the limits within which individual states can attempt to cope with such problems through unilateral action without risk of adversely affecting the interests of others have steadily narrowed. But, as previously observed, rather than encourage increasing interest in supranational solutions, the frustrations born of this *de facto* shrinkage of sovereignty have generated an unhelpful backlash of nationalism. And this, of course, has been one of the key factors that have affected the nature and effectiveness of the international community's response to the terrorist threat.

What International Constraints?

With the exception of a number of bilateral agreements providing, *inter alia*, for a greater exchange of intelligence and technical assistance or, as in the memorandum of understanding concerning hijackers of aircraft and vessels that was signed by the US and Cuba in 1973, for the prompt extradition of specified categories of terrorists, the international response to terrorism has been relatively weak and ineffective.

The UN's problems in grappling with *transnational* terrorism were cited and illustrated at the outset of this study. *International* terrorism, however, has proved to be a somewhat less contentious issue. Indeed, the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States which the General Assembly adopted without vote on 24 October 1970 asserts at one point that:

Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission

of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.*

But even as an essentially unenforceable admonition, this rule of behavior is weakened and clouded by the greater emphasis that the Declaration accords to the "principal of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." The language employed in this regard implies that it is the overriding duty of all states to assist groups struggling for the realization of these rights in every way possible. For example, the Declaration avers that:

Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives people referred to above in the elaboration of the present principles of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. [Emphasis added]**

There have, in addition, been a total of five international conventions adopted over the past 12 years that have dealt with one or another aspect (in all cases rather narrow) of the terrorism problem. These are as follows:

- The Tokyo Convention (Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft): Signed in September 1963, it did not come into force until December 1969. It is a very limited accord which does no more than to set a few jurisdictional ground rules and to require the contracting states to (1) make every effort to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander and (2) arrange for the prompt onward passage or return of hijacked aircraft together with their passengers, cargo, and crew. As of this writing, 77 countries have ratified it.
- The Hague Convention (Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft): Signed in December 1970, it came into force 10 months later. Its principal feature is that it requires (albeit with important discretionary exceptions) contracting parties either to extradite or to prosecute skyjackers. Seventy-four countries have ratified it.
- The Montreal Convention (Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety

of Civil Aviation): Signed in September 1971, it came into force in January 1973. Covering the sabotage or destruction of aircraft or air navigational facilities, it requires the contracting parties to make such offenses subject to severe penalties and establishes the same extradition-or-prosecution system for offenders as in The Hague Convention. Sixty-three countries have ratified it.

—The Organization of American States Convention (Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance): Signed in February 1971, it entered into force in October 1973 (the US is a signatory, but not a party). With its emphasis on the prevention and punishment of crimes against persons to whom the state owes a special duty of protection under international law, it was a precursor of the UN convention concerning the protection of diplomats which is cited below. It also employs The Hague Convention extradite-or-prosecute formula. Only four of the thirteen signatory countries have ratified it.

—The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents: Signed in December 1973, it has yet to come into force. It requires the contracting states to establish certain specified acts against protected persons (or against the official premises, private accommodations, or means of transport of such a person) as crimes under internal law. Once again, The Hague Convention on extradite-or-prosecute formula applies. So far, only nine countries have ratified it.

Although they reflect international concern and at least a slim majority consensus that something must be done, these conventions presently do not, singly or in combination, constitute much of an effective constraint on terrorist activity. In the first place, many states—including a high percentage of those that have been particularly active in supporting revolutionary or national liberation groups—are not yet parties thereto. Secondly, the conventions lack teeth in that all make the extradition or prosecution of terrorists subject to discretionary escape clauses and none provides for the application of punitive sanctions against states that simply refuse to comply at all. Finally, the exclusive focus on skyjacking and the

*Yearbook of the United Nations: 1970 (New York: United Nations Office of Public Information, 1971), p. 790.

**Ibid., p. 791.

protection of diplomats leaves a good deal of terrorist activity outside the cognizance of international law.

But this, it would seem, is all the traffic will bear. The US has tried repeatedly to correct some of these deficiencies and has run into a stonewall of opposition on each occasion. For example, at the conclave sponsored by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) that formulated the final draft of The Hague Convention, the US delegation sought unsuccessfully to (1) limit drastically exceptions to extradition of hijackers, (2) establish hijacking as a common crime, and (3) exclude political motivation as a defense against extradition or prosecution of hijackers. Two years later, in September 1972, the US submitted a draft convention to the UNGA that was aimed at limiting the "export" of terrorism. But even though it established a number of restrictive criteria that would have to be met before its enforcement provisions became applicable, it was effectively stifled by opposition centering on the impermissibility of interference with the right of self-determination. The following summer, a proposal sponsored by the US and several other nations for a separate enforcement convention that would have backed the Tokyo, Hague, and Montreal documents with sanctions affecting the rights and services guaranteed under existing international and bilateral air service agreements was soundly defeated at the ICAO's Rome Conference and Assembly.

The obstacles which have blocked more effective international action are formidable. They have, as previously indicated, included the controversy over *justifiable* versus *illegal* political violence and broad resistance to such further infringements of national sovereignty as would be implied in any inflexible curtailment of the right to grant political asylum. Equally important, however, they have also included an understandable reluctance on the part of many nations otherwise ill-disposed toward terrorist activity to commit themselves to any course of action that might either invite direct terrorist retribution or provoke the application of sanctions by states that happen to be sympathetic to the terrorists' cause.

To make these observations is not, however, to imply immutability. It must be remembered, for example, that such progress as has been made in the field of multilateral countermeasures has, in each instance, been occasioned by reaction to some general or specific escalation of terrorist violence. (In this regard, hopes that Carlos' assault on the OPEC ministerial meeting in Vienna will have some sort of

salutary catalytic effect may yet be borne out in practice.) There are, moreover, a host of other factors which could alter the attitudes and behavior of any of the state actors concerned. Hence, whether or not all the obstacles to a more effective international response that have been cited thus far will retain their present force in the decade ahead is a valid question—and it is one that is addressed below.

IV. THE OUTLOOK

International Terrorism

Although it is possible that a few others may emulate the irresponsible behavior of Libya's Colonel Qaddafi, international terrorism seems unlikely to pose much of a threat to world order or US interests during the next few years. Even in its presently weakened state, the international system subjects states to a host of legal obligations and practical constraints that they can ignore only at considerable risk. The continuing force of these considerations is evidenced by the fact that international terrorism is no more prevalent today than it was in 1968.

Indeed, throughout the entire postwar era, both the weak and the musclebound have tended to view international terrorism as a policy tool to be used sparingly and (except when exercising their "right" of retaliation) discreetly when potentially effective alternative means are lacking. Moreover, while no apologetics for such activity is intended, it should be noted that—with the exception of certain actions undertaken in connection with the Middle East conflict—its objectives have generally been defensive (e.g., the neutralization of hostile foreign-based groups or individuals) as opposed to the offensive and deliberately disruptive character of most transnational terrorism.

Nevertheless, the sporadic employment of government-controlled terrorist groups against Israeli targets both within and outside that country's borders raises some troublesome questions about what the 1980s may hold in store. And while their true sponsorship has yet to be firmly established, so do the recent Rejectionist Front-associated operations in Madrid and Vienna that were intended to bring pressure on moderate Arab regimes.

These questions center on the kind of adjustments in international behavior that may flow from ongoing changes in the distribution and component elements of national power and, no less important, from the growing array of economic, political, and technological restraints affecting the ways in which

latent power can be translated into effective leverage. Are Arab actions a precursor of things to come? Is it, in fact, likely that, lacking or despairing of more conventional means for defending or advancing their international interests, an increasing number of states will opt to engage in—or to sponsor—terrorist activity?

In assessing this possibility, some observers have noted that because of the expense, the risks, and the constraints deriving from the patron-client relationships that are now involved, high-intensity conventional warfare—even of the local variety—may be becoming obsolete. On the other hand, although it is “permissible” under current international ground rules, low-level protracted conflict of the Vietnam type is not, as they point out, a very attractive alternative. For these reasons, they suggest that there will be a strong temptation for governments to employ terrorist groups as means of waging “surrogate warfare” against other nations. Brian Jenkins has expressed this notion as follows:

Terrorists, whatever their origin or cause, have demonstrated the possibilities of a third alternative—that of “surrogate warfare.” Terrorism, though now rejected as a legitimate mode of warfare by most conventional military establishments, could become an accepted form of warfare in the future. Terrorists could be employed to provoke international incidents, create alarm in an adversary's country, compel it to divert valuable resources to protect itself, destroy its morale, and carry out specific acts of sabotage. Governments could employ existing terrorist groups to attack their opponents, or they could create their own terrorists. Terrorism requires only a small investment, certainly far less than what it cost to wage conventional war. It can be debilitating to the enemy. Prior to the 1973 Yom Kippur War, a senior Israeli officer estimated that the total cost in men and money to Israel for all defensive and offensive measures against at most a few thousand Arab terrorists was 40 times that of the Six Days War in 1967. A secret backer of the terrorists can also deny sponsoring them. The concepts of subversion sabotage, of lightning raids carried out by commandos, are not new, but the opportunities are.*

The case presented, however, is far stronger with respect to the probability of increasing resort to some form of surrogate warfare—which, as Brian Jenkins notes, is scarcely a new phenomenon—than for the corollary argument that this development is likely to be characterized by widespread adoption of terrorist tactics.** For one thing, the safety factor of deniability

*Brian Jenkins, *International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict*, op. cit., p. 21.

**It must be remembered that under the definitions employed in this study, there are many kinds of covert subversive activity—including support of insurgent paramilitary forces and even sponsorship of highly discriminate sabotage operations—that would not of themselves constitute terrorism.

would all but disappear if a state were to engage in such activity on a regular basis. For another, barring total collapse of world order and consequent international anarchy (something that no state actor has reason to promote), international terrorism is highly unlikely to gain acceptance as an admissible form of behavior in the foreseeable future.

All told, in fact, it seems likely that the employment of terrorist groups in a surrogate warfare role will continue to be more the exception than the rule for some time to come. And if this proves to be the case, it follows that while there may be a slight upward trend in the annual total of international terrorist incidents, the scope of the problem in 1985 should not be much more serious than it is today.

Transnational Terrorism

On balance, the outlook with respect to transnational terrorism is less encouraging. On the positive side, the decline in the number of states willing to provide terrorist safe haven gives promise of being lasting.* It seems most doubtful that the currently shrinking aggregations of emigre workers will soon regain their former size, and this will probably have some small impact on the security and resources of terrorist groups operating in Western Europe. More importantly, political developments of a sort which presently seem to be at least possible could significantly reduce levels of terrorist activity in such current trouble spots as Northern Ireland, Argentina, and the Middle East.

But overall, the potential for domestic, international, and transnational terrorism is—as asserted at the outset of this study—almost certain to remain high. Furthermore, most of the broad environmental factors that have contributed to the feasibility, efficacy, and popularity of transnational terrorism in recent years will continue to operate with at least equal force in the decade ahead. The salience of some, in fact, seems bound to increase.

Barring some cataclysmic event which reduces mankind to a more primitive order of existence, technological advance, modernizing social and economic change, and growing global interdependence are, for example, essentially irreversible phenomena

*Although this trend has been evident for some time, it was underscored in August 1975 when the JRA terrorists who had seized the US Consulate in Kuala Lumpur not only had great difficulty in finding a state willing to grant them safe haven, but were even denied permission to transit nationally-controlled airspace by some Third World countries.

with an urgency and momentum which seems more likely to increase than to decline in the coming decade. And while their political consequences can, to a certain degree, be controlled by carefully-tailored policy decisions, they bode well to aggravate the terrorism problem by generating further increases in (1) divisive ethnicity and nationalism, (2) urban unrest, (3) terrorist capabilities, and (4) societal vulnerabilities.

In the political field, the widespread erosion of established institutions of authority that has both invited and facilitated terrorist activity in recent years shows no signs of abatement. For its part, the postwar international order seems likely to remain under challenge—and thus in flux—throughout the decade ahead. But the problem will probably continue to be most evident at the national level where increasing difficulties of governance hold forth the prospect of a further proliferation of ineffective and unstable regimes.

As a byproduct of the above, most non-state actors on the world stage will probably manage to escape significantly firmer national or international control for some time to come. Because of this, and because the values underlying the strong "social conscience" component of today's political environment seem likely to retain their current force, the chances are that national liberation and leftist revolutionary formations will continue to receive both moral and material support from a wide variety of transnational and international organizations as well as a potentially substantial flow of ransom and "insurance" payments from vulnerable multinational corporations.

At the same time, the trend toward greater international contact and cooperation among terrorist groups that has already markedly enhanced the operational capabilities of some of the organizations involved seems likely to gain further momentum. For one thing, lingering inhibitions born of sharply different goals and outlook are bound to decline in the face of continuing and widely-publicized proof of the advantages that can be derived from such a course. For another, the tough but scattered local counter-terrorist campaigns that are sure to dot the political landscape throughout the decade ahead will each provide compelling new incentives for transnational cooperation.

Ominously enough, therefore, the wave of the future seems to be toward the development of a complex support base for transnational terrorist activity that is largely independent of—and quiet resistant to control

by—the state-centered international system. This does not mean, however, that the behavior of supportive state actors will become increasingly irrelevant. On the contrary, it suggests that unless the principal patrons of subversion and revolutionary violence cut back on the assistance they are furnishing to practicing or potential terrorists more drastically than currently available evidence as to their intentions gives grounds to expect, the deleterious impact of their behavior may be considerably greater than in the past.

The problem of extensive and sometimes sympathetic publicity is another aggravating environmental factor that promises to persist in many parts of the world. Not only has all the attention that has been focused on terrorism made it increasingly newsworthy, but the coverage and capabilities of the world's satellite communications systems have been steadily upgraded since 1968. Moreover, radio, television, and the press are bound to continue to reach an ever larger audience.

Although most Western media officials, at least, are by now fully aware of the danger of playing into terrorist hands, competitive pressures are strong and the line between responsible and irresponsible reportage or commentary is very fine. In short, self-censorship is unlikely to work very well. On the other hand, the only potentially more effective alternative—firm governmental management of the news—is, in time of peace, virtually out of the question in most Western democracies.

Another aspect of the information explosion that promises to continue to be troublesome is the diffusion of terrorist-adaptable technological know-how and—to a lesser degree—of possibly inspirational speculation about new and potentially ultra-disruptive terrorist tactics. Although the objectives of such literature may be (and most often are) above reproach, it can scarcely help but aggravate the problems posed by the development and wholesale deployment of sophisticated (and in many cases, man-portable) weaponry; the world-wide proliferation of nuclear facilities; and the race, motivated by both political and economic considerations, to sell nuclear technology and modern armaments to developing countries. And these problems are serious enough as it is. Indeed, despite the attention that has been paid to nuclear safeguards and the physical security of sensitive installations and depots, the world seems to be moving toward a state of affairs in which the limits of any "technological escalation" of terrorist violence will depend more on the self-imposed restraints

affecting the behavior of the groups involved than on lack of capability or opportunity.

It is, of course, the upper limits of the potential scale of terrorist violence that are of most concern. Individual terrorist groups already have the capability of manufacturing or otherwise acquiring a variety of weapons or agents of mass destruction. More will be in a position to exercise this option in the future. Just how likely is it that they will do so?

That the threatened employment of such awesome ordnance would have profound political and psychological effects is undeniable. But it must be emphasized that there are major hazards that would be involved for the terrorists as well. The most important of these (and the one probably primarily responsible for the failure of terrorists to make more of an effort to exploit mass destruction technology in the past) is the high risk of adverse public reaction—particularly in the event that the group involved were to end up in a position where it felt compelled to make good its threat.

Although a few terrorist groups have, in fact, resorted to indiscriminate mass murder, such instances have been relatively rare, and in each case thus far the human toll has been negligible in comparison to the casualties that would result from the broadcast of only a few ounces or less of a highly toxic agent or the detonation of even a small nuclear device. Basically, terrorists are in business to influence people, not exterminate them. Moreover, those that aspire to some sort of political legitimacy—and this means most of them—are generally quite sensitive to the need to take some care to avoid alienating local and international opinion.

The fact remains, however, that weapons of mass destruction cannot help but hold considerable temptation for militants whose basic strategy of violence centers on wringing maximum political leverage from publicity and fear. Hence, it seems prudent to assume that sooner or later some group is bound to take the plunge.

Because their very mention strikes terror into the hearts of many, nuclear weapons come first to mind. But the practical problems facing the would-be nuclear blackmailer are numerous and complex. Although nuclear devices are clearly no longer beyond terrorist reach, their acquisition (whether through theft or manufacture) is still—and for a few years yet will probably continue to be—a relatively demanding task. Once in terrorist hands, their emissions present anti-detection shielding problems not only during

passive storage but, if deployed against specific targets, during the delivery and bargaining phases of the operation as well. Moreover, there is further room for trouble when it comes to establishing the credibility of the threat since the target authorities must be persuaded not only that the terrorists actually have a nuclear device but that it will probably work. Finally, all but the most fanatical terrorists might be given pause by the fact that if worst comes to worst, the destructive effects of such weapons are not manageable.

Thus, while the prospect of nuclear-armed terrorists can scarcely be dismissed, a more likely scenario—at least in the short term—would seem to be a terrorist seizure of a nuclear weapons storage facility or a nuclear power plant in a straightforward barricade operation. Such a group need not threaten a nuclear holocaust (although that possibility would be in the back of everyone's mind), just the destruction of the bunker or reactor with the attendant danger of radiological pollution. The threat would be inherently credible. The publicity would be enormous. And if their demands were to be denied, the terrorists would be in a position to tailor the amount of damage they actually inflicted to their appreciation of the existing circumstances.

A more pressing threat, however, would seem to lie in the field of chemical, biological, and radiological agents. In contrast to nuclear devices, many of these are presently relatively easy to acquire. Hence the danger that they could turn up in the hands of the sort of ultra-radical or psychopathic fringe group that would have the fewest compunctions about actually using them is very real. Moreover, since small—sometimes minute—quantities are usually all that are needed for potentially devastating effects, such agents also tend to be easy to conceal, easy to transport, and easy to introduce into the target area. Credibility poses few problems, for a small sample of the agent delivered by mail or left at some designated pick-up point should quickly dispel any doubts on this score. Finally, a number of these agents offer the additional advantage of being amenable to relatively selective targeting (e.g., the occupants of a single building or compound).

As implied in earlier discussion, any such dramatic escalation of terrorist violence as that suggested by these brief scenarios on weapons of mass destruction would be likely to touch off a new flurry of efforts to devise international countermeasures. Indeed, another convention or two would probably result. But just how

much practical effect this would have is open to serious question.

Simply put, the net thrust of the forces at work within the international community promises to remain more centrifugal than centripetal throughout the decade ahead. Indeed, all indications are that rising nationalism and ethnicity, the developing nations' fundamental challenge to the existing world order, and the related proliferation of subnational and other non-state actors will continue to render the international system increasingly complex and uncertain. Moreover, the attendant diffusion and erosion of political authority will tend to be self-reinforcing. And under these circumstances, the degree of consensus needed to adopt and enforce meaningful counterterrorist accords will be more elusive than ever.

It follows that the recent stiffening of a number of nations' policies toward terrorists is almost certainly more reflective of relatively narrow and quite disparate tactical calculations—with respect, for example, to such things as improved domestic security arrangements, the current state of play in the Arab-Israeli conflict, or the latitude of action that may now be afforded by Third World divisions and the general unpopularity of certain terrorist groups—than of any broad upsurge of interest in a global approach. Nonetheless, this development is encouraging for it opens up new possibilities for bilateral and limited multilateral counterterrorist undertakings of a sort that have, in combination with unilateral measures, proved relatively effective in the past.

In sum, although it is unlikely to trigger a collapse of world order, transnational terrorism promises to pose a continuing and potentially gravely unsettling problem for the world community until such time—possibly years hence—that the international system gels into new and generally accepted contours. The frequency and intensity of violence will decline in some areas. The cast of characters will be constantly changing. In all likelihood, technological and organizational innovations in the security field will make terrorism a more risky affair. Yet at best the overall number of terrorist groups seems unlikely to decline—and the number of countries in which they are active appears destined to grow. Furthermore, because of their symbolic value, their availability, and the embarrassment they can create, the popularity of *American targets* will probably remain high.

Ironically, there may well be fewer *people* engaged in transnational terrorist activity some five years hence than there are today. But this prospect is not as encouraging as it sounds. For even if changes in the political environment or partial satisfaction of their objectives do encourage some of the larger and more "responsible" formations to eschew transnational violence, their place on the international stage is likely to be quickly filled by more militant splinter groups—not to mention a smattering of total newcomers to the game. And since (as amply demonstrated by the JRA, Carlos and company, and the PFLP) small terrorist groups can, when properly connected, mount all manner of highly disruptive operations, such a development could—through the introduction of additional increments of fanaticism—provoke at least temporary increases in the intensity of terrorist violence.

In any event, it seems likely that the constraints on terrorist behavior will, through international default, continue to depend primarily on (1) the terrorists' subjective orientation and (2) the policies and resources of the individual countries in which they operate. Of necessity, however, the impact of these will be uneven. Remember, too, that the inherent dynamics and logic of a campaign of terrorist violence are such that it has a natural propensity to escalate over time. Moreover, all but the most isolated terrorist groups will be able to draw on a common and cumulative media-fed pool of experience and inspiration. Hence, even if the cited constraints do result in some tapering off in the frequency of transnational terrorist incidents during the next few years, we should expect to witness steadily greater and more widespread sophistication in targeting, execution, and weaponry. And while, as suggested earlier, most groups will probably continue to be deterred by both moral considerations and calculations of the risks involved, the danger that a fanatic few might resort to weapons of mass destruction will increase accordingly.

V. IMPLICATIONS

Two basic messages emerge from the foregoing discussion. The first is that the phenomenon of widespread internationalized terror is not only likely to persist for at least the next several years, but also to evolve in ways that could pose a more substantial threat to US interests—and, under certain circumstances, to world order—than in the recent

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past.* The second is that the factors bearing on this phenomenon and its political ramifications are so numerous and cut across so many jurisdictional and disciplinary lines that the development of more effective national and international countermeasures is likely to be a particularly demanding task.

Whether or not weapons of mass destruction are actually brought into play, the odds are that the impact of transnational and international terror will be more sharply felt in the US in the years just ahead. There is, for example, good reason to believe that at least a few foreign terrorist groups are planning to step up their attacks on American targets abroad in the near future. Moreover, the influx of foreign travellers and dignitaries expected in connection with such major US-sponsored events as the current Bicentennial celebrations and the 1980 Winter Olympics will inescapably afford a host of opportunities for dramatic terrorist action. Hence, despite the likelihood that the practical considerations that have so far generally deterred foreign-based terrorist groups from extending their areas of operation to US shores will retain their present force, there is a good chance that a few will succumb to the temptation to do so.** Finally, no matter how tough and well-publicized a "no concessions" policy the US Government maintains, it seems likely that Washington will be targeted by terrorist demands somewhat more frequently in the future—partly to probe more fully the limits of US resolve, partly for sheer publicity or other psychological effect, and partly to foster intergovernmental or domestic tensions.

More importantly, perhaps, even if the problem of internationalized terror is not brought "closer to home" in the ways suggested above, it promises to impinge more directly on US interests and options

*Despite the frequency with which terrorists have attacked American citizens and property overseas, the US has been lucky in many ways. For example, foreign terrorist groups have for the most part eschewed staging operations on American soil—and those transnational terrorist incidents that have been authored here by domestic groups have generally been relatively minor affairs. Furthermore, the US Government has, as previously indicated, rarely been the target of terrorist demands. Hence, except for extensive (and readily accepted) airport security measures, the quality of American life and democratic freedoms has been little affected. And Washington has so far been spared the agony of having the lives of key political leaders or large numbers of innocents, be they Americans or foreigners, hang on its decisions.

**While it bears note, the parallel danger that commonly perceived opportunities for action in connection with such events could result in growing contact and cooperation between US-based and foreign terrorist groups falls outside the purview of this study.

with respect to a broad range of critical issue areas. For example, it is likely to:

- Figure as even more of an irritant in both East-West and North-South relations;
- Sharpen the dilemmas inherent in the politically and economically sensitive questions of arms sales and the transfer of advanced technology;
- Provide potential new grounds for strains in Washington's relations with its principal friends and allies;
- Reinforce some of the obstacles which currently impede efforts to find a mutually-acceptable way to cope with the dependence of Western industrialized countries on foreign energy sources; and
- Impose burdensome new demands on limited human and material resources.

Although, as emphasized in earlier discussion, the dimensions of the threat posed by international and transnational terror should not be overdrawn, the picture outlined above is sobering. Among other things, it suggests that the machinery and guidelines that the US and its allies have so far developed for dealing with the problem bear careful review.

There is no magic formula for endowing any given government's approach to the problem of terrorism with the direction, breadth, and coherence required to marshal the remarkably disparate talents and resources that are needed and to weave its response into the overall fabric of its domestic and foreign concerns. Indeed, any number of alternative courses of action could prove equally effective. Nevertheless, it bears emphasis that together with *timely intelligence* and *sound multi-disciplinary analytical support*, *flexibility* and *extensive coordination* (both inter- and intra-state) would seem to be critical to devising and implementing a counterterrorist strategy that is both internally consistent and minimally disruptive to national values and foreign policy objectives in terms of "hidden" social, economic, and political costs.

Obviously, such a strategy cannot be framed in isolation. Among other things, its architects would need ready access to top policymakers in both the foreign and domestic fields as well as to the advice of a broad range of government and non-government experts or interested parties. Moreover, the necessity to maintain some freedom of maneuver (born of the fact that every new terrorist incident is likely to have its unique aspects) is a particularly delicate

problem—and one that can easily contribute to unnecessary misunderstandings. Hence, routine pre-crisis coordination of terrorism-related policies and

contingency plans with all the key domestic and foreign actors whose interests and options they could affect becomes all the more important.

APPENDIX A

INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM: SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES

Group Characteristics

- Name of the organization or, if none, of the political, military, or bureaucratic entity controlling the actors
- Country of origin
- Relationship to the government of that country
- Size and organization
- Leadership
- Composition (the occupational and educational qualifications of the members and their age range)
- Credo/Ethos

Elementary Typology*

Particularistic (ethnic, religious, linguistic, or regional)

Nationalistic (irredentist or anti-colonial)

Ideological

Anarchism

Radical Left (revolutionary socialists, Trotskyites, Maoists, Guevarists, Castroites, and other ultra-left fringe groups)

Orthodox Communism

Extreme Right

Other

Pathological

- Domestic base (extent of popular sympathy and support, links with legitimate social or political organizations, and links with other domestic dissident groups)
- Foreign links (with other terrorist organizations, with international or legitimate transnational organizations, and with foreign governments)
- Life cycle (date of formation, period or periods of transnational or international activity, and, if applicable, date of demise)

Event Characteristics

- Location of incident
- Nature of act

Elementary Typology

Kidnapping

Barricade and hostage

Bombing (any type of explosive charge or device, including letter and parcel bombs)

*Major categories are not mutually exclusive.

Armed assault or ambush (with or without sophisticated weapons)
Hijacking (aircraft, ship, or other means of transportation)
Incendiary attack or arson
Assassination or murder
Chemical, bacteriological, or radiological pollution
Other

- Number, status, and nationalities of human victims
- Nature and national association of physical target
- Number, nationality, and organizational affiliation of the perpetrators
- Nature of demands (publicity, prisoner release, ransom, political action or change, arms, or safe passage)
- Targets of demands (governments, corporations, or international organizations)
- Outcome (duration of incident, identity and posture of governmental and transnational actors participating in its resolution, extent to which terrorists' demands were satisfied, fate of human victims, rate of terrorists, extent of property damage, and, if applicable, identity of nations granting or facilitating safe haven)

Local Environmental Characteristics

- Type, repressiveness, and effectiveness of government (representative democracy, authoritarian, or totalitarian)
- Societal traditions and attitudes with respect to authority and violence
- Homogeneity of the population
- Current levels of popular malaise and internal strife
- Current level of socio-economic development (including per capita GNP; levels of industrialization, urbanization, and literacy; and the proportion of the population possessed of higher education)
- Recent and current socio-economic growth rates (as above)
- Societal inequities (markedly unequal distribution of income, discriminatory practices, and systemic limits on social and political mobility)

Global Environmental Characteristics

- Technological Advance
 - Sophisticated man-portable weaponry (development, deployment, and international trade in such weapons)
 - Proliferation of nuclear facilities
 - Communications advances (developments affecting both media coverage and tactical communications)
 - Mobility-related developments
- Interdependence
 - New vulnerabilities (those links binding our increasingly interdependent world—e.g., commercial and communications centers, transportation hubs, international power grids and pipelines, super tankers, and jumbo

aircraft—that presently, or that may in the future, offer feasible and potentially highly disruptive targets for terrorist attack









- Reactive upsurge of nationalism and ethnicity
- Modernizing Social and Economic Change
 - Destablizing local effects
 - Large emigre worker concentrations
- Political Environment
 - The “revolutionary” atmosphere highlighted by the challenge to the existing world order raised by the “have not” nations
 - The controversy over illegal versus justifiable political violence
 - Shifts in priorities and values and the emergence of a strong sense of “social conscience”
 - The dispersion and erosion of political authority
 - The proliferation of non-state actors and the parallel increase in the number of international and transnational organizations providing moral or material support to national liberation or leftist revolutionary formations
 - International agreements, treaties, and conventions relating to terrorist acts
 - The behavior of states providing direct and indirect support to terrorist groups
 - Transnational contact and cooperation among terrorist groups
- Significant international economic trends and developments
 - Extra-cyclical events
 - Cyclical fluctuations

APPENDIX B

STATISTICAL TRENDS AND PATTERNS
IN
TERRORIST ACTIVITY

International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents by Category, 1968-75

Total: 913




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
*Includes 2 non-air hijackings.

Geographic Distribution of Terrorist Incidents, by Category, 1968-75

North America Total: 111



Western and NATO Europe Total: 327



Middle East and North Africa Total: 118




Sub-Saharan Africa Total: 37



Asia Total: 43



Latin America Total: 250



USSR/Eastern Europe Total: 19



Pacific and Australia Total: 6



Transregional Total: 1



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*Mass letter bomb mailing.

International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents Directly Affecting US Citizens, Corporations, or Institutions

	Kidnap	B & H	Bomb	Ass't	Hijack ¹	Arms	Incend.	Other	Total
1968-1975									
Total incidents	123	31	375	95	137	48	59	45	913
US citizens or property known to have been victimized	59	4	130	37	20	15	33	17	330
US government target of terrorist demands	4 ²	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
1968									
Total incidents	1	0	24	2	6	4	0	0	37
US citizens or property victimized	1	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	5
US government target of demands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1969									
Total incidents	3	0	17	5	25	2	2	1	55
US citizens or property victimized	2	0	9	1	1	1	1	1	16
US government target of demands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1970									
Total incidents	26	1	17	6	47	6	2	9	114
US citizens or property victimized	15	0	12	4	16	3	1	5	56
US government target of demands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1971									
Total incidents	10	1	15	8	14	3	6	6	63
US citizens or property victimized	4	0	12	4	7	0	5	6	38
US government target of demands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1972									
Total incidents	11	3	38	6	16	4	3	5	86
US citizens or property victimized	1	0	18	2	3	0	1	1	26
US government target of demands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1973									
Total incidents	34	8	81	29	15	12	20	12	211
US citizens or property victimized	18	2	34	14	0	3	12	2	85
US government target of demands	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
1974									
Total incidents	12	9	95	24	0	8	11	11	170
US citizens or property victimized	5	1	32	6	2	2	7	2	57
US government target of demands	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
1975									
Total incidents	26	0	88	15	5	9	15	1	168
US citizens or property victimized	13	1	18	6	0	3	6	0	47
US government target of demands	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3

¹ Excludes numerous non-terrorist skyjackings, many of which victimized US planes or citizens.

² This figure does not, of course, reflect more than a score of cases in which ransom demands were levied on--or were eventually at least partially satisfied by--U.S. corporations or private citizens.

International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents by Regional Origin of the Perpetrators—1968–1975

	Kidnap	B & H	Bomb	Ass't	Hijack	Assass.	Incend.	Other	Total
North America	4	0	21	4	5	0	3	0	37
Western and NATO Europe	10	1	61	10	5	3	4	4	98
Middle East and North Africa	5	17	41	31	25	12	2	15	148
Sub-Saharan Africa	16	1	1	5	6	1	0	0	30
Asia	6	5	2	4	11	3	5	0	36
Latin America	53	5	45	8	12	10	5	12	150
USSR/Eastern Europe	0	1	3	1	15	3	0	0	23
Uncertain or Mixed	29	1	201	32	58	16	40	14	391
Total	123	31	375	95	137	48	59	45	913

International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents—Fedayeen and Non-Fedayeen by Category of Event: 1968–1975

	Kidnap	B & H	Bomb	Ass't	Hijack	Assass.	Incend.	Other	Total
Fedayeen or Fedayeen-related	8	18	48	35	19	13	3	15	159
Non-Fedayeen	102	13	240 ¹	53	70	20	37	22 ²	584
Unknown	13	0	78	7	39	6	10	8	170
Total	123	31	375	95	137	48	59	45	913

¹Includes the sole transnational terrorist attack on a nuclear installation during the period under review—the 1975 bombing of a nuclear power facility in France by the Puig Antich-Ulrike Meinhof Commando. It bears note, however, that Argentina's ERP did briefly occupy an unfinished Argentine nuclear power plant in March 1973, an act which falls in the category of domestic terrorism.

²Includes the only two incidents in which a chemical, biological, or radiological agent has been used to induce terror to date (the radio-active iodine employed by the self-styled "Justice Guerrilla" in Austria in 1974).

International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents—Fedayeen and Non-Fedayeen by Year: 1968–1975

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Fedayeen or Fedayeen-related	3	10	21	10	19	46	33	17
Non-Fedayeen	31	28	60	28	40	112	137	148
Unknown	3	17	33	25	27	53	9	3
Total	37	55	114	63	86	211	179	168

**Indiscriminate or High Casualty International or Transnational Terrorist
Bombings and Armed Assaults by Regional Origin of the
Perpetrators: 1968-1975**

	Randomly-Determined Innocent Parties Deliberately Victimized		More than 10 Non-Terrorist Casualties	
	Bombing	Armed Assault	Bombing	Armed Assault
North America	2	0	0	0
Western and NATO Europe	19	4	9	0
Middle East and North Africa	17	21	3	4
Sub-Saharan Africa	1	2	0	0
Asia	0	1	0	1
Latin America	7	2	2	0
USSR/Eastern Europe	1	0	0	1
Pacific and Australia	0	0	0	0
Unknown or Mixed	55	10	3	1
Total	102	40	17	7

**Indiscriminate or High Casualty International or Transnational Terrorist
Bombings and Armed Assaults by Selected Groups
1968-75¹**

	Randomly-Selected Innocent Parties Deliberately Victimized		More than 10 Non-Terrorist Casualties	
	Bombing	Armed Assault	Bombing	Armed Assault
BSO: Black September Organization ²	6	2	0	0
IRA (Provos): Irish Republican Army, Pro- visional Wing	9	0	8	0
JRA: Japanese Red Army	0	1	0	1
PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	1	3	0	1
Mohammed Boudia Commando	1	2	1	0
PFLP-GC: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command	0	1	0	1
Yugoslav Emigre Groups	2	1	1	1

¹When their overall record is taken into account, the listed groups appear to have been among the least inhibited with respect to the number, fate, or ostensible "guilt" of their victims.

²Although the incident is not reflected in these statistics, the BSO is perhaps best known for the bloody barricade and hostage operation it staged in connection with the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich.

**Indiscriminate or High Casualty International or Transnational Terrorist
Bombings and Armed Assaults—Fedayeen and Non-Fedayeen:
1968-1975**

	Randomly-Determined Innocent Parties Deliberately Victimized		More than 10 Non-Terrorist Casualties	
	Bombing	Armed Assault	Bombing	Armed Assault
Fedayeen or Fedayeen-related	20	24	3	5
Non-Fedayeen	50	14	14	1
Unknown	32	2	0	1
Total	102	40	17	7

Region: Western and NATO Europe

Name, description, or category of group	Primary location	Parent country or territory	Ethos
Established prior to 1968?			
Date of most recent transnational/inter-national terrorist act			
Current status			
Significant transnational links?			
Significant direct or indirect support from state actors?			
(comment)			
Kidnapping			
Barricade and hostage			
Bombing			
Armed assault or ambush			
Hijacking			
Assassination			
Incendiary attack or arson			
Other			
Total			

Name, description, or category of group	Priority
<p>1. <i>Adiantum</i> sp.</p>	<p>1</p>
<p>2. <i>Adiantum</i> sp.</p>	<p>2</p>
<p>3. <i>Adiantum</i> sp.</p>	<p>3</p>
<p>4. <i>Adiantum</i> sp.</p>	<p>4</p>
<p>5. <i>Adiantum</i> sp.</p>	<p>5</p>
<p>6. <i>Adiantum</i> sp.</p>	<p>6</p>
<p>7. <i>Adiantum</i> sp.</p>	<p>7</p>
<p>8. <i>Adiantum</i> sp.</p>	<p>8</p>
<p>9. <i>Adiantum</i> sp.</p>	<p>9</p>
<p>10. <i>Adiantum</i> sp.</p>	<p>10</p>
<p>11. <i>Adiantum</i> sp.</p>	<p>11</p>
<p>12. <i>Adiantum</i> sp.</p>	<p>12</p>
<p>13. <i>Adiantum</i> sp.</p>	<p>13</p>
<p>14. <i>Adiantum</i> sp.</p>	<p>14</p>
<p>15. <i>Adiantum</i> sp.</p>	<p>15</p>
<p>16. <i>Adiantum</i> sp.</p>	<p>16</p>
<p>17. <i>Adiantum</i> sp.</p>	<p>17</p>
<p>18. <i>Adiantum</i> sp.</p>	<p>18</p>
<p>19. <i>Adiantum</i> sp.</p>	<p>19</p>
<p>20. <i>Adiantum</i> sp.</p>	<p>20</p>

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

<p> Libertario (Argentine Liberation Force) FAR: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Revolu- tionary Armed Forces) FAP: Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas (Peronist Armed Forces) </p>	<p> Gas Arg </p>
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				in jail	survivors and sympathizers						
Fug Anti-Communist Machof Comrades	FRG	FRG	Radical Left/Anarchist	No	1975	Active	Yes	Unknown	Urban-based, bombed a French nuclear power station in 1975	3	3
2nd of June Movement	FRG	FRG	Radical Left/Anarchist	No	1975	Active	Yes	Unknown	Used 1975 kidnapping was Radio edition	1	1

was being pointed out to Peter Laertes to secure release of—and Middle East safe haven for—5 Bader-Meinhof Gang members

		No	1975	Active	Yes	Yes	Both arms and total strength estimated at well over 1,000	Has struck at official Algeria installations
IRA (Provo): Irish Republican Army, Provisional Wing	U.K. Ireland	Northern Ireland	Nationalist/Partisanist (Catholic)	No				
Soldiers of the Algerian Opposition	Western Europe	Algeria	Unknown	No	1975	Active	Unknown	Has struck at official Algeria installations

	and Rome
South Moluccan Earthquake	1
Netherlands	1
Moluccan Islands	3
Particularist (Separatist)	
Yes	
Active	
Unknown	
Unknown	

Swiss Ultra-Leftist Groups^a	Switzerland	Radical Left Anarchist	Mostly 1975	Active	Yes	Unknown	Urban-based
No						5	2 7

THAT: Turkish People's Liberation Army	Turkey	Radical Left (Marxist)	No	1972	Active	Yes	Unknown	Ultra-left, strong	1	2	3	4	5
								estimated at about 100					

1. Allegedly a three-lane vigilante group, Cristo Rey is generally believed to operate under the protection—and possibly control—of Spanish police authorities. It just how many such attacks were actually executed by Cristo Rey is, however, uncertain. At least some may have been the work of ATE (Anti-ETA Terrorism) a new, seemingly McCarthy-based, and possibly officially

NOTEWORTHY GROUPS:

APPENDIX C

Most Active or Most Publicized Practitioners of International and Transnational Terrorism*

Region: Latin America

* Unavailable or
known or suspected
international acts:
1 January 1968-31 December 1975

Known or suspected transnational or
international terrorist acts:
1 January 1968-31 December 1975

	Hijacking	Assassination	Incendiary attack or arson	Other	Total	Name, description, or category of group	Primary location	Parent country or territory	Ideology	Established prior to 1968?	Date of most recent transnational/international terrorist act	Current status	Significant transnational links?	Significant direct or indirect support from state actors?	Comment	Kidnapping	Barriade and hostage	Bombing	Armed assault or ambush	Hijacking	Assassination	Incendiary attack or arson	Other	Total
9						ALN: Agpe Libertadora Nacional (Action for National Liberation)	Brazil	Brazil	Radical Left (once Castroite, now eclectic)	No	1970	Inactive since 1973	Unknown	Yes	Kidnappers of U.S. Ambassador Elvira	3								3
4						ELN: Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army)	Bolivia	Bolivia	Radical Left (Guevarist)	Yes	1970	Active	Yes	Unknown	Much weakened by government counter-measures	1				1				2
1						ERP: Ejército de Liberación del Pueblo (People's Revolutionary Army)	Argentina	Argentina	Radical Left (Marxist)	No	1974	Active	Yes	Yes	Both urban and rural. Ransomed an American corporation executive for \$14.2 million in 1974	11		2	2	3	1			33
3						FAL: Frente Argentino de Liberación (Argentine Liberation Front)	Argentina	Argentina	Radical Left	Yes	1974	Active	Unknown	Yes	Primarily urban	1				1				3
1						FAR: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Revolutionary Armed Forces)	Guatemala	Guatemala	Radical Left (Castroite)	Yes	1973	Active	Unknown	Unknown	Both urban and rural	4				1				5
1						FAP: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Peronist Armed Forces)	Argentina	Argentina	Radical Left (Peronist, Marxist)	Yes	1974	Active	Unknown	Unknown	Primarily urban. Has frequently collaborated with ERP.					1		2		3
3						FER (Federación de Revolucionarios Estudiantiles)	Mexico	Mexico	Radical Left	No	1975	Relatively inactive	Unknown	Unknown	Primarily urban	3								3
1						FLN: Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista Front of National Liberation)	Nicaragua	Nicaragua	Radical Left (Castroite)	Yes	1974	Active	Yes	Yes	Staged spectacular bank-robbery and hostage operation in Managua in December 1974									2
1						MANO: Movimiento Argentino Nacional Organizado (Argentine National Organization Movement)	Argentina	Argentina	Extreme Right	No	1970	Unknown	Unknown	Yes	Targeted Soviet officials	1								2
1						MLN: Tupamaros (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional) (National Liberation Movement)	Uruguay	Uruguay	Radical Left (once Castroite, now eclectic)	Yes	1973	Active	Yes	Yes	Urban, dedicated in 1972-73, ca 1,000 members at peak	6								12
1						MONTONEROS: "Juan José Valle" Montoneros	Argentina	Argentina	Popular Left (Peronist with Marxist leanings)	Yes	1975	Active	Unknown	Unknown	Primarily urban, merged with radical left. Peronist Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) in 1973. Holds ransom record of over \$80 million for a single action.	5		2	1	1	1	3		12
1						OPR-33 (Organization of the Popular Revolution-33)	Uruguay	Uruguay	Radical Left Anarchist	No	1972	Inactive	Unknown	Unknown	Small, primarily urban, badly weakened by arrests in 1972	3								3
1						2nd of September Communist League	Mexico	Mexico	Radical Left	No	1975	Active	Unknown	Yes	Small, primarily urban	2				1				4
1						VPR: Vanguarda Popular	Brazil	Brazil	Radical Left (Castroite)	No	1970	Inactive	Unknown	Yes	Primarily urban, dedicated in 1972	4								5

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Name, description, or category of group	Primary location	Parent country or territory	Ethnic	Established prior to 1968?	Date of most recent transnational/international terrorist act	Current status	Significant transnational links?	Significant direct or indirect support from state actors?	Comment	Known or suspected transnational or international terrorist acts: 1 January 1968-31 December 1975
IRA (Provisional) Army	U.K., Ireland	Northern Ireland	Particulars (Catholic)	No	1971	Active	Yes	Yes	South Africa and Portugal strength estimated at over 1,000. Has street at official Algerian installations in Paris, Bonn, London and Rome.	1
Boat Uthmaniyah Group	Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabia	Radical Left/Anarchist	No	1973	Active	Yes	Yes	Uthmaniyah (Uthmaniyah) strength estimated at about 100.	1

South Moluccan Front	Netherlands	Moluccan Islands (Indonesia)	Particulars (Separatist)	Yes	1975	Active	Yes	Yes	Uthmaniyah (Uthmaniyah) strength estimated at about 100.	1
Boat Uthmaniyah Group	Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabia	Radical Left/Anarchist	No	1973	Active	Yes	Yes	Uthmaniyah (Uthmaniyah) strength estimated at about 100.	1
TPPL: Turkish People's Liberation Army	Turkey	Turkey	Radical Left (Marxist)	No	1973	Active	Yes	Yes	Uthmaniyah (Uthmaniyah) strength estimated at about 100.	1

1 Allegedly a free-lance vigilante group, Cristo Rey is generally believed to operate under the protection—and possibly control—of Spanish police authorities. A just how many such attacks were actually carried out by Cristo Rey is, however, uncertain. At least some may have been the work of ATE (Anti-ETA Terrorism), a sect, seemingly money-based, and possibly officially-sponsored Spanish organization which surfaced in July 1975 following the arrest of one of its members in northern France.

2 Associated with the Red Army Faction (RAF) Group.

3 Includes Fern Knave Group and Lige Marxist Revolutionary (LMB).

Region: Sub-Saharan Africa

Name, description, or category of group	Primary location	Parent country or territory	Ethnic	Established prior to 1968?	Date of most recent transnational/international terrorist act	Current status	Significant transnational links?	Significant direct or indirect support from state actors?	Comment	Known or suspected transnational or international terrorist acts: 1 January 1968-31 December 1975
ELF (Ethnic Liberation Front) Front	Equatorial Guinea	Equatorial Guinea	Particulars (Separatist)	Yes	1975	Active	Yes	Yes	Primary rank strength estimated at over 6,000 members.	1
ELF (Ethnic Liberation Front) Front	Equatorial Guinea	Equatorial Guinea	Particulars (Separatist)	Yes	1975	Active	Yes	Yes	Primary rank strength estimated at over 6,000 members.	1
Popular Revolutionary Party	Zaire	Zaire	Radical Left	No	1975	Active	Yes	Yes	Renowned for role in kidnapping operation. Were still holding a French national hostage as the close of 1975 despite Paris' earlier partial accession to their ransom demands.	1
Tobou Rikob (Self-styled "Armed Forces of the Chadian Revolution")	Chad	Chad	Particulars (Marxist)	Yes	1974	Active	Yes	Yes	French national hostage as the close of 1975 despite Paris' earlier partial accession to their ransom demands.	1

Region: North America

Name, description, or category of group	Primary location	Parent country or territory	Ethnic	Established prior to 1968?	Date of most recent transnational/international terrorist act	Current status	Significant transnational links?	Significant direct or indirect support from state actors?	Comment	Known or suspected transnational or international terrorist acts: 1 January 1968-31 December 1975
Actions Cubana	U.S.	Cuba	Nationalist, Anti-Communist	No	1974	Latent	No	No	U.S.-based	1

2nd of September Committee	Mexico	Mexico	Particulars (Separatist)	Yes	1975	Active	Yes	Yes	Primary rank strength estimated at about 100.	1
VR: Vanguarda Popular Revolucionaria (Popular Revolutionary Vanguard)	Brazil	Brazil	Particulars (Separatist)	Yes	1975	Active	Yes	Yes	Primary rank strength estimated at about 100.	1

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2nd of September Committee	Mexico	Mexico	Particulars (Separatist)	Yes	1975	Active	Yes	Yes	Primary rank strength estimated at about 100.	1
VR: Vanguarda Popular Revolucionaria (Popular Revolutionary Vanguard)	Brazil	Brazil	Particulars (Separatist)	Yes	1975	Active	Yes	Yes	Primary rank strength estimated at about 100.	1

1 Figures include bombing, shelling, and harassment by contrast to the actions under its own name in 1975, but FLEP has acted a benefit from Lybia support.

Region: North America

Name, description, or category of group	Primary location	Parent country or territory	Ethos	Established prior to 1968?	Date of most recent transnational/international terrorist act	Current status	Significant transnational links?	Significant direct or indirect support from state actors?	Comment	Kidnapping	Harricade and hostage	Bombing	Armed assault or ambush	Hijacking	Assassination	Incendiary attack or arson	Other	Total
Armed (Cuba)	U.S.	Cuba	Nationalist, Anti-Communist	No	1974	Unknown	No	No	Urban-based			2	1					3
El Alamo (The Scorpion)	U.S.	Cuba	Nationalist, Anti-Communist	No	1975	Active	No	No	Urban-based			3						3
El Poder Cubano (Cuban Power)	U.S.	Cuba	Nationalist, Anti-Communist	Yes	1968	Inactive	No	No	Urban-based			20	1	1				22
FLNC: Cuban National Liberation Front	U.S.	Cuba	Nationalist, Anti-Communist	No	1975	Active	No	No	Urban-based			9	2					11
FLQ: Front de Liberation du Quebec (Quebec Liberation Front)	Canada	Canada (Quebec)	Communist	Yes	1970	Inactive	Yes	Unknown	Urban-based, about 100 members at peak			2						2

Known or suspected transnational or international terrorist acts:
1 January 1968-31 December 1975

Region: Asia

Name, description, or category of group	Primary location	Parent country or territory	Ethos	Established prior to 1968?	Date of most recent transnational/international terrorist act	Current status	Significant transnational links?	Significant direct or indirect support from state actors?	Comment	Kidnapping	Harricade and hostage	Bombing	Armed assault or ambush	Hijacking	Assassination	Incendiary attack or arson	Other	Total
Maoist	Japan	Japan	Radical Left	No	1974	Active	Unknown	Unknown									3	3
Marxist Maoist Youth League	Japan	Japan	Radical Left	No	1975	Active	Unknown	Unknown									1	1
Ohnawa Liberation League	Ohnawa	Ohnawa	Particularist (Separatist)	No	1975	Active	Unknown	Unknown										
Philippine Muslim Rebels (including Moro National Liberation Front)	Philippines	Southern Philippines	Particularist (Muslim)	Present	1975	Active	Unknown	Yes										3

Known or suspected transnational or international terrorist acts:
1 January 1968-31 December 1975

1 Include co-called "Ama"
2 A multi-national group
3 The JCR is composed of
4 Include "Treason" (the
5 "Treason" group, the "Treason"
6 "Treason" group, the "Treason"
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PTLP: Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine
OANY: Organization
Arab Nationalist Youth
for the Liberation
Palestine
PTLP-OC: Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine-
Urban-Operational Command
Bakal: Vanguard of the
Popular Liberation War

"Cathar" Group, AKA
Mohammed Roshan
Commando AKA AKA
of the Arab Revolution
JCR: Revolutionary
Coordination Front
JUL: Jewish Defense League
JRA: Japanese Red Army
(Japanese Red Army)
Yugoslav Emigre Terrorist
(Group)

Nominal Marzouk									
active terrorist group (the Marzouk People's Sacrifice Guerrilla) is under urban Both urban and rural Strength estimated at over 1,000 Libya-sponsored, closely linked to PFLP									
Broke away from PFLP in 1982									
Founded by Syrian Baath Party, acts as extension of Syrian regime									
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